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Abstract
Frustration over the undemocratic nature of the 1968 Democratic Party presidential
nominating contest set forth a reform movement that forever changed the Democratic
Party and America’s political system. The resulting Committee on Party Structure and
Delegate Selection (better known as the McGovern-Fraser Commission), at the direction
of the 1968 convention, opened the Democratic Party to those outside of the Democratic
establishment. The next 14 years would see a struggle between the Democratic Party
establishment and “outsiders” over who would control the Democratic Party and its
nominating process.

This study examines the four major Democratic Party nominating process reform
commissions over the 1970s and 1980s (McGovern-Fraser, Mikulski, Winograd, and
Hunt) and whether or not each commission responded proportionately to perceived
challenges from preceding election cycles. Additionally, this document provides
analysis through the lens of the most recent Democratic Party nominating contest to
prove that despite a strong role for the Democratic Party establishment, the current
nominating system does not conflict with the original goals of Democratic Party
reformers.
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“Being in politics is like being a football coach. You have to be smart enough to
understand the game, and dumb enough to think it’s important.”

– Eugene McCarthy
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Introduction

Just look at us at here tonight: Black and white, Asian and Hispanic, Native and
immigrant, young and old, urban and rural, male and female - from yuppie to lunchpail,
from sea to shining sea. We're all here tonight in this convention speaking for America.
And when we in this hall speak for America, it is America speaking.
- Walter Mondale, 1984 Convention Speech

When the 1968 campaign began, only twenty-six men had held the privilege of
being the Democratic Party’s presidential nominee in 140 years. In smoke-filled rooms
and union halls, party elite chose from among the best and most loyal leaders that their
party had to offer, eager to control the Executive Branch.
How the Democratic Party nominating process moved from the exclusive
convention halls to the farmhouses of Des Moines and the small polling places in
Dixville Notch is the result of the ultimate set of political dominoes. In the shadow of an
unpopular war, activists opened the Democratic Party nominating process and set off a
decades long battle for control of the direction of a slowly growing Democratic Party.
As the Democratic Party attempted to perfect a system that would nominate a
candidate reflective of all stakeholders – citizenry, activists, interest groups, and party
officials – the party established a series of commissions directed to make further changes
to democratic reforms, both to further open the process and reassert establishment
authority.
1

Reforms did not simply occur when the Democratic Party faced serious electoral
failure, but after close races and successes as well. With the most significant changes
coming after an extremely close electoral loss and an outsider victory, the Democratic
Party reform movement represented a see-saw between outsiders and the party
establishment as the party attempted to navigate its way through a sea of unintended
consequences.
The arc of party reform is long and complex – but what were the intentions of the
original reformers? Have the reforms set in motion by activists created a Democratic
Party in line with their desires? The Democratic Party nominating contest is a far cry
from where it was in 1968, and how the Party picks its candidate remains an evolving
issue with serious tension.
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1| The First Domino Falls
The 1968 Convention and the Commission on the Democratic Selection of Presidential
Nominees

I do not see in my move any great threat to the unity and strength of the
Democratic Party--whatever that unity may be today and whenever that
strength may be.
Eugene McCarthy, November 30, 1967

On March 12, 1968, Minnesota Senator Eugene McCarthy, the protégé of political
giant and sitting Vice President Hubert H. Humphrey nearly pulled an upset over
President Johnson in the first-in-the-nation New Hampshire Primary. Though Johnson
had refused to list his name on the Granite State ballot, McCarthy nearly bested the
President, winning 42% of the vote. Fearing the power of a McCarthy surge, Johnson
supporters organized a write-in movement that helped Johnson hold on to 48.5% of the
vote. But Johnson lost a critical perceived victory and 20 of 24 New Hampshire
delegates.1 Counting Republican write-in votes for McCarthy and Johnson, Johnson’s
victory was by a meager 230 votes.2

1

New Hampshire Union Leader. 1968: McCarthy stuns the President. May 3, 2011.
http://www.unionleader.com/article/99999999/NEWS0605/110509966 (accessed January 15,
2012).
2
White, Theodore H. The Making of the President 1968 (New York, NY: Atheneum House, Inc.,
1969), 89.
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Four days later, declaring a “profound difference” with President Johnson “over
where we are heading and what we want to accomplish,” New York Senator and former
Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy announced that he too would seek the Democratic
Nomination for President.3 On March 31, faced with a significant challenge from the
left, President Johnson surprised the nation by declaring he would not be a candidate for
President in 1968. Johnson began preparing to retire to Texas after thirty-seven years in
Washington.
The nation was tired of Vietnam and, to anti-war activists in the Democratic
Party, Johnson offered no solution to an endless war. But while Kennedy and McCarthy
began competing in nominating contests across the country, Vice President Hubert
Humphrey was quietly working behind the scenes to make a serious bid for the
nomination himself. In April 1968, just after the final state contest filing deadline for the
Democratic nomination,4 Humphrey formally announced his candidacy, with Senators
Fred Harris of Oklahoma and Walter Mondale of Minnesota serving as managerial
campaign co-chairs. 5 Additionally, Humphrey brought on former Postmaster General
Lawrence O’Brien (who would soon serve as Democratic National Committee
Chairman), setting him up in an office next to Humphrey’s in the Executive Office
Building to oversee the effort.6
The state-by-state contest would continue between McCarthy and Kennedy. The
June 4th California primary looked to be a critical contest, and Kennedy’s 46-42%
victory over McCarthy set the stage for a certain convention showdown. In perhaps one

“Robert F. Kennedy Announcement of Candidacy for President.”
85 – CQ 1968
5
“Hubert H. Humphrey Washington Declaration of Candidacy for Presidential Nomination.”
6
Fred R. Harris, Does People Do It?: A Memoir, 133.
3
4

4

of the most pivotal political moments of the twentieth century, Sirhan Sirhan, a twentytwo year old Jordanian assassin, shot and killed Kennedy with a .22 caliber pistol.
The nation was in shock and the Democratic nominating contest was thrown into
chaos. Had Kennedy survived the gunfire, a convention battle was all but certain. Now,
despite failing to run in a single contest against two anti-Vietnam candidates, it was
increasingly likely that Vice President Hubert Humphrey was poised to become his
party’s nominee for President.
The divide over the war was very real; it had been the issue that had ultimately
forced a legendary statesman back to Texas. In many ways, the Democratic establishment
had failed to predict just how divisive the Vietnam issue could become. In a letter just
nine days before Eugene McCarthy announced his candidacy for President, Maine
Democratic Party Chairman George Mitchell, who would play a significant role in party
reform, wrote to the head of Dissenting Democrats of Maine, Howard Coursen:
…unless this group comes up with feasible, constructive alternatives to
our present policy in Vietnam—something that similar groups in other
states have conspicuously failed to do—then I do not believe that they will
have any significant impact upon either the Democratic Party or general
electorate in Maine.7
With Kennedy out of the running, Democrats bound for the Windy City faced a
choice between two candidates: an establishment stalwart who served as the Vice
President of the man with whom they so vehemently disagreed, and, his former protégé,
an anti-Vietnam Senator from Minnesota. Kennedy’s campaign would live on
symbolically, however, as anti-war South Dakota Senator George McGovern announced
7

George J. Mitchell, Letter to Dissenting Democrats of Maine
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that he would place his name in nomination in honor of Robert F. Kennedy just days
before the Chicago convention. McGovern believed that he could successfully make the
case to the anti-war delegates that Hubert Humphrey, the inevitable nominee, should be
their candidate. Despite the fact that a McCarthy-Kennedy delegate alliance may have
had the potential to overtake Humphrey, 8 no unity effort was born. When asked the
difference between his candidacy and that of Senator McCarthy, McGovern reportedly
said “Well, Gene really doesn’t want to be President, and I do.”9
To no major surprise, Vice President Humphrey carried the nomination with just
over two-thirds of all delegates. McCarthy carried just under a quarter of the convention,
with 601 total votes, and McGovern’s symbolic crusade placed him third with 147
delegates. While Humphrey supporters celebrated his victory, Americans across the
country watched as rioting caused havoc in the streets of Chicago.
As the pandemonium continued outside of the convention hall in Chicago, Hubert
Humphrey slept soundly. Inside the convention bubble, it may have been difficult for
Humphrey to know what was going on outside, especially as Mayor Daley’s precinct
captains held signs to the television cameras that said “WE LOVE OUR CITY. WE
LOVE OUR MAYOR. WE LOVE OUR POLICE TOO.”10
Despite forcing President Johnson out of the race and winning several state
contests, Eugene McCarthy’s bid for the Democratic Nomination was futile. But while
the streets of Chicago were burning, a group of committed McCarthy activists from
Connecticut were working to ensure that no outsider candidate faced such an uphill battle

8

White, The Making of the President 1968, 267.
Ibid, 266.
10
Ibid, 357
9
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again. For the group of Constitution State activists and students, their inspiration and
path to Chicago had been anything but conventional.
Revolution at Hartford High School
On January 8, 1968, with Eugene McCarthy nearly two months into the race for
the Democratic Party nomination, DNC and Connecticut State Democratic Chairman
John Bailey declared, “We know who our nominees will be…we will gather next August
to nominate our President, Lyndon Johnson, and our Vice President, Hubert
Humphrey.”11 For Connecticut supporters of Eugene McCarthy, there was no question
where the party establishment laid its support.
Additionally, bizarre rules in Connecticut meant that any challenger to the party
establishment’s candidate would have to be inventive. Connecticut’s state party rules
elected national delegates at a state convention made up of municipal-level delegates,
formulated by the town’s Democratic vote in the preceding election as long as two years
before the election. McCarthy supporters faced difficult odds in electing delegates to the
national convention. Democrats in a town could force a primary contest by gathering the
signatures of at least 5% of registered Democrats in that town and offering a slate in
opposition to the one chosen by the town caucus or municipal committee. 12
Determined to force a competitive contest, supporters led by Yale Law Student
and activist Geoffrey Cowan forced nominating contests in several municipalities,
offering competing slates featuring, in each case, an individual with the last name

11

"The Democratic Choice." Commission on the Democratic Selection of Presidential Nominees
(1969), 40-41
12
The Democratic Choice, 75.
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“McCarthy” at the top of the slate.13 The insurgents used this obscure party rule in 31
towns.14
At the June state convention, McCarthy delegates were awarded 9 of 44 delegates
to the national convention, proportional with the 200 of 960 state delegates awarded by
earlier state contests.15 McCarthy supporters were of the opinion that they were entitled
to more.16 Connecticut Democratic Party Chairman John Bailey had attempted to forge a
compromise by offering a set number of delegates to the activists, but disgruntled
McCarthyites were in no mood to compromise. As one delegate reportedly said,
I’m sick of this pragmatic kind of bullshit. Who cares about those ten
goddamned delegates and who cares about losing our credibility with the
hacks of the Democratic Party? We didn’t get into politics to play the
same old games, the same crappy compromises that led to our getting into
Vietnam in the first place. We’re better than that. If we walk out of this
convention, we’re telling the world that we stand for a different kind of
politics, better than anything the John Bailey types could possibly
understand. 17
Led by activist Geoffrey Cowan, inspired by Theodore Roosevelt’s decision to
walk out of the 1912 Republican Convention, McCarthy supporters marched to the
Hartford High School Annex to hold their own counter-convention. Cowan acted as
Chair of the convention described as “more in the nature of a pep political rally,” where

13

Geoffrey Cowan, interviewed by author, via telephone, January 30, 2012.
Richard Harris and Daniel Tichenor, A History of the U.S. Political System: Ideas, Interests,
and Instiutions, 85.
15
Byron E. Shafer, Quiet Revolution (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1983) 15.
16
Geoffrey Cowan, interviewed by author, via telephone, January 30, 2012.
17
Lanny J. Davis, The Emerging Democratic Majority (New York: Stein and Day, 1974), 57.
14
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“the enthusiastic supporters cheered and shouted in between mouthfuls of pizza and
soda.”18
Cowan and other activists did not just want more delegates from their state to the
Chicago convention – they wanted meaningful reform. Cowan and other McCarthyites,
including Democratic activist Stephanie May (the mother of future influential Canadian
political leader Elizabeth May) determined that the best option was to form a group to
study undemocratic Democratic Party rules, modeled after the successful National
Commission on Civil Disorders (known as the “Kerner Commission”). At the very least,
a well-researched document could serve as a basis for a challenge on the Connecticut
rules in Chicago. Well-respected delegates like playwright Arthur Miller and Yale Law
Dean Louis Pollak could ensure attention and a well-articulated argument.19
The Commission was formed, with Iowa Governor Harold E. Hughes, a
McCarthy supporter (who would place his name into nomination in Chicago) as
chairman, and Minnesota Congressman Donald Fraser as Vice Chairman. Joining the
commission, among others, was former JFK advisor Fred Dutton, who would play a key
role in George McGovern’s 1972 bid for the White House.20 The commission began
swiftly assembling reports on the nominating procedures of the Democratic Party of each
state and planning for the Chicago Convention.
The commission prepared a quickly written document that, because of the
complexity of 51 different sets of party rules and election laws, would offer broad
suggestions for reforms that would open the process to all voters, allow delegates to be
chosen on the basis of support for candidates and issues, appointed in a reasonable
McCarthy Supporters Hold Rump ‘Convention’, Mildred Zaiman, Hartford Courant 6/23/68
Shafer, The Quiet Storm, 15.
20
Shafer, The Quiet Storm, 18.
18
19

9

timeframe and in respect to fair apportionment, and in respect to voter preferences. 21
McCarthyites worked to push the resolution through several convention channels,
including the Rules and Credentials Committees. Thanks to attention on the divisive
platform debate few were focused on fights over party rules.
Among the most controversial items that McCarthyites wished to eliminate was
the unit rule, which allowed a sort of winner-take-all system within each state delegation.
The rule, which had roots as far back as the 1852 Democratic Convention, was originally
written to allow delegates to vote based on their personal preferences if they had not
received specific instructions from their state party. Despite attempts to end the rule in
1868 and 1894, to follow the lead of the GOP, the rule had carried on with no protections
for the minority, other than the ability to poll the national delegation (in which case the
unit rule would still prevail).22
The unit rule greatly advantaged powerful leaders with pull in their delegation
like famous party boss Mayor Daley of Chicago. As CBS’ Martin Plissner reportedly
said, “If Daley instructs the Illinois delegates to vote for Ho Chi Minh, all but twenty
votes will go to Ho Chi Minh without question.” 23 Humphrey’s supporters were willing
to bargain by passing a resolution to lift the unit rule for the 1972 convention – but
McCarthy supporters wanted the rule gone immediately. Humphrey reportedly told
Texas National Committeeman Frank Erwin “I don’t want to try to abolish what I think is
an undemocratic rule by undemocratic procedure.”24

21

The Democratic Choice, 18-19.
The Democratic Choice, 48-49.
23
White, The Making of the President 1968, 309.
24
CQ 194
22
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Activists would ultimately help to push three reform resolutions out of the 1968
convention. The first was a part of the motion of the Special Equal Rights Committee to
establish a commission on party structure. Following a dispute over the legitimacy of an
all-white Mississippi delegation at the 1964 convention, a commission was formed to
work for fair delegate seating opportunities for minorities at the 1968 convention.
Humphrey had hoped to make the group a permanent one.25 The commission, chaired by
New Jersey Governor Richard Hughes (following the death of Governor David Lawrence
of Pennsylvania), called for a Commission on Party Structure to be formed “to study the
relationship between the National Democratic Party and its constituent state Democratic
Parties, in order that full participation of all Democrats without regard to race, color,
creed or national origin may be facilitated by uniform standards for structure and
operation.”26 The resolution received no debate and little attention. 27
Additionally, the McCarthy organizers who had assembled as a result of the
Connecticut walkout were successful in passing a party reform resolution as part of the
Credential Committee Report, calling for the establishment of a commission that would
make recommendations to the Democratic Party on expanding participation and provide
support to help states make changes in regard to “timeliness,” “Grass-roots participation,”
and to examine the appropriateness of the “Unit rule at the state and local level.” 28
But the closest thing that McCarthy supporters got to an outright coup d’état was
the passage on the floor of the minority report to the rules committee. When the report
was offered on the convention floor as an amendment to the Rules Committee’s majority

25

CQ 194
CQ - 198
27
Shafer, The Quiet Storm, 33.
28
CQ 200
26
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report, most delegates were either confused to the motion or believed that the substance
of the resolution was its first section, ending the unit rule. 29
But the second section of the motion, unlike the two other reform motions passed
in Chicago, had bite, requiring that:
(2) All feasible efforts have been made to assure that delegates are
selected through party primary, convention, or committee procedures
open to public participation within the calendar year of the National
convention.
While Byron Shafer writes in The Quiet Storm that Missouri Governor Warren
Hearns’ ability to pull the Missouri delegation to support the amendment was the work of
Harold Hughes’ lobbying,30 McCarthy supporter Lanny Davis reports in The New
Democratic Majority that Hearns was as confused as other delegates. Davis alleges that
after polling an ambivalent and silent delegation, Hearns simply cast Missouri’s decisive
78 votes in favor of the minority report. As McCarthy operative Eli Segal later said,
“The Democratic Party reform movement was born out of confusion thanks to the
support of a Governor who had presided over one of the most undemocratic systems of
delegate selection in the country. What poetic justice.” 31
Whether or not he understood the resolution, Governor Hearns’ support helped to
bring in among the most drastic and fundamental changes that the Democratic Party and
presidential politics had ever seen. Hearns, and most delegates, were completely
oblivious to the fundamental changes to come – changes that would democratize the
Democratic Party.
29

Shafer, The Quiet Storm, 34-35.
Shafer, The Quiet Storm, 38.
31
Davis, The Emerging Democratic Majority, 40-41.
30
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As Theodore White wrote in The Making of the President 1968, “…[McCarthy]
had brought with him, into the arena of protest and politics, thousands of young people
who would, forever after, insist on being part of politics.” 32
The Fall Campaign
Despite the havoc in Chicago, Hubert Humphrey and his running mate, U.S.
Senator Edmund S. Muskie of Maine, fared fairly well in the fall. Though the
Democratic Ticket only carried 191 electoral votes in thirteen states and the District of
Columbia, the ticket came within 812,000 votes of President Nixon in the popular vote.
However, the results were certainly affected by the American Independent Party
candidacy of Alabama Governor George Wallace, who carried five Southern States and
13% of the electoral vote. His white, working-class appeal was a precursor to many
things to come in the future of the Democratic Party. Without Wallace in the race, some
pollsters found that four out of five votes would have gone for Nixon. 33
Had Wallace succeeded in carrying a few southern states where he ran very close
to Nixon, the race would have been forced into the U.S. House of Representatives. Given
the makeup of the 90th Congress, it is likely that Hubert Humphrey could have prevailed.
Even with a relatively close contest after a divided nomination fight, the winds for
reform were still blowing. Following the directive of the 1968 Convention, Humphrey
friend Fred Harris sought and subsequently won election as Chairman of the Democratic
National Committee. Harris received the backing of Humphrey, the “titular head” of the
Democratic Party, motivated to reform the Democratic Party, after O’Brien refused
Humphrey’s request to stay on. Humphrey reportedly felt that he owed Harris the
32

White, The Making of the President 1968, 266.
WGBH. “George Wallace – the 1968 Campaign.” 2000,
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/wallace/peopleevents/pande07.html.
33
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position, having passed him over in favor of Ed Muskie for the second spot on the
Democratic ticket that fall. 34
…in preparing for the next meeting of the National Committee on January
14, where Harris would be confirmed, he set his staff to combing the
record of the 1968 Convention, to guarantee precise execution of all
convention directives. What he discovered, of course, was that he was
under orders to appoint not two commissions, but three; a Rules
Committee, a Special Committee, and a Committee on Party Structure, the
successor to the Special Equal Rights Committee.35
After seeking and receiving support for a motion to combine the party structure
and delegate selection committee resolutions that had come out of Chicago into one
commission, Harris’ first priority was to appoint George McGovern as Chairman of the
commission created by the 1968 directive. “I appointed McGovern chair of the reform
commission because he was identified with opposition to the Viet Nam War, probably by
then a majority opinion among Democrats, and had the support of the Robert Kennedy
people,” recalled Harris. “I thought he would, therefore, help make the commission and
its report more credible to all factions of the Party.”36
“I didn’t really want to do it,” Senator McGovern said of chairing the
commission, “because I feared that it would lead to resentment in the party, and I felt that
as a candidate [for the Democratic nomination in 1972] I shouldn’t do it.” 37

34

Shafer, The Quiet Storm, 49.
Shafer, The Quiet Storm, 51.
36
Fred R. Harris, e-mail message to author, January 25, 2012.
37
George McGovern, interviewed by author, via telephone, April 21, 2010.
35
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McGovern accepted the position of party chair, to the dismay of some who felt
that Howard Hughes, who had chaired the previous reform commission, was entitled to
oversee the new commission. The Humphrey wing of the Democratic Party believed that
Hughes had been disloyal to the party by enthusiastically supporting and nominating
McCarthy at the 1968 convention.38
Proportionate Responses?
The Democratic Party reform movement born over pizza and soda pop in West
Hartford sparked a series of changes and motions that would change how candidates and
supporters campaigned for the nomination – and how they governed once in office.
Through the 1970s, the changing Democratic establishment and reformers worked to
establish and modify reforms to make the nominating process both more democratic and
more inclusive.
The 1968 primary represented the beginning of a very real divide between the
Democratic establishment and an emerging reform movement. A shift toward a more
open Democratic Party would not, however, diminish a divide marked between an
establishment associated with the ideological center of the Democratic party and a reform
movement linked to the very left of the Party.
The twenty years that followed the tumultuous Chicago convention saw a focused
effort by reformers to open and keep open the Democratic Party. The election of the first
post-reform President would lead to a pendulum swing as the Democratic Party
establishment attempted to protect an incumbent and reassert itself in a process
increasingly out of their control.

38

George McGovern, Grassroots (New York: Random House, 1977), 136.
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Through analysis of commission reports and documents (when available),
journalistic accounts, and interviews with reform activists, reform commission chairs,
candidates, elected officials, campaign staffs, and Democratic Party leaders, this thesis
attempts to analyze whether or not the Democratic Party acted proportionately to address
its perceived and actual challenges in modifying reforms through an era greatly
characterized by party reform.

Chapter One addresses how the Democratic Party responded to the mandate
established by the 1968 convention and how reforms dramatically changed the
format of the 1972 nominating contest.
Chapter Two discusses how Democrats responded to perceived problems from
the 1972 nominating process, became increasingly concerned about the long-term
effects of an open, democratic contest, and how the party quickly shifted direction
following the election of the first post-reform Democratic president toward
incumbency protection.
Chapter Three explains how the Democratic establishment worked to reinsert
itself into the nominating process, and how a close 1984 contest helped propel the
party toward a more democratic one.
Chapter Four looks at the 2008 Democratic nominating contest twenty years
after the major reforms and attempts to discuss whether or not the 2008 contest,
which represented the first major opportunity for an African-American or woman
to lead a major party ticket, was representative of the earliest intentions of the
reformers.
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1| Mandate for Reform

“What Kind of Delegation is this?
They’ve got six open fags and only three
AFL-CIO people on that delegation! Representative?”
- AFL-CIO President George Meany, 1972

The Commission on Party Structure and Delegate Selection was big. In addition
to Chairman George McGovern and Vice Chairman Harold Hughes, twenty-six members
from different backgrounds across the country joined the commission. The commission
delicately represented various interests, including members of Congress, Governors, and
party activists.
Not all were happy with Chairman Harris’ appointments. Some had privately
discussed the idea of a “shadow commission” after Harris had refused to appoint
individuals like Anne Wexler (a major force in the Connecticut challenge) and had
chosen McGovern over Harold Hughes.39 Supporters had even reserved space the first
day of the McGovern Commission’s efforts in case Hughes desired to revive his preconvention committee.40 Despite Harris’ reluctance to appoint several McCarthy
Commission members, McGovern brought many members of the Hughes Commission

39
40

Shafer, The Quiet Storm, 65.
Ibid, 69.
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into the discussion as advisors and committee staff.41 “And this was to be, as it soon
became clear” wrote Theodore White, “a runaway staff.”42
While it was not clear to many that McGovern was considering a bid himself in
1972, interests of major potential presidential contenders were represented on the
commission. George Mitchell, a Democratic National Committeeman from Maine, was
the protégé of Maine Senator Ed Muskie. Ted Kennedy’s name was thrown around
(decreasingly after an incident in Chappaquiddick, Massachusetts in 1969), and sent Fred
Dutton, a former aide to President Kennedy. Additionally, committee member Warren
Christopher had served as Deputy Attorney General under President Kennedy and was a
supporter of Bobby Kennedy’s 1968 bid.
Among the biggest challenges to the commission was the decision by many
influential organized labor leaders not to formally participate. While I.W. Abel of the
United Steel Workers was appointed a member of the commission, he would soon
withdraw, as it appeared that those who had been most vocal in their critiques of the “old
system” in 1968 would lead the commission. As Humphrey confidante Max
Kampelman said in Byron Shafer’s The Quiet Revolution, in many ways, labor was that
“old system”:
Abel was being a good soldier. He was doing [AFL-CIO leader George]
Meany’s bidding. Labor was intransigent, stubborn, and proud. Here was
labor, which had given more than it had ever given-more money, more
effort, and more intelligence. For that group, which did more for the party

41
42

Shafer, The Quiet Storm, 70.
Theodore H. White, The Making of the President 1972 (New York: Atheniumm, 1973), 23.
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than the party did, for that group to have to go to Fred Harris and ask for
something – it was not dignified, they would not do it.43
Al Barkan, Chairman of the AFL-CIO’s Committee on Political Education
(COPE) attempted to privately lobby Harris against reform. According to Harris, Barkan
and Meany believed that the Commission “was being overwhelmed by the views of
‘radical’ youth and ‘pushy’ African Americans and women.”
Harris says that he consistently responded “surely they didn't think, did they, that
members I'd appointed, such as I. W. Abel, head of the Steelworkers (whom I knew
favorably from our service together on the Kerner Commission), and Senator Birch Bayh
of Indiana, people whom Labor liked, were "radicals" or could be overwhelmed by
radicals. I managed to keep Labor relatively quiescent, at least publicly, on reform--and I.
W. Abel, incidentally, supported it.”44
Despite McGovern’s urging, many influential labor leaders simply would not
participate. As members reportedly told McGovern repeatedly, “The party which
nominated Roosevelt and Truman does not need reforming.” Labor did have
representation through commissioner William Dodds of the United Auto Workers, and
the UAW often provided space for the commission’s hearings around the country. 45 The
UAW had withdrawn for the AFL-CIO in 1968 following a political split between Meany
and UAW President Walter Reuther.46 Additionally, some left-leaning unions like

43

Shafer, The Quiet Storm, 93.
Fred R. Harris, e-mail message to author, January 25, 2012.
45
Shafer, The Quiet Storm, 108.
44

46

Dark, Taylor E. "Organized Labor and Party Reform: A Reassessment," Polity XXVII, no. 4 (Summer
1996): 509.
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American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees (AFSCME) and the
Communication Workers of America (CWA) did express support for reform efforts.47
The 1964 Special Equal Rights Commission and the motions that originated from
the 1968 convention represented a growing pattern of a centralized, national Democratic
Party asserting power over the states. Prior to 1964, a “national party” only existed at the
will of the states which gathered every four years to nominate a presidential candidate
and establish a platform. In deciding just who state parties could send to its quadrennial
meetings, the Demoratic Party was becoming a nationalized institution. The Democratic
Choice had described the pre-reform Democratic National Committee as an “ineffectual
and dependent body.”48 Congressman David Price, a veteran in the party reform
movement, would later describe presidential nominating contests as a “system of
decentralized local and state party politics.”49
While a nationalized Democratic Party was in its infancy, the only way for
meaningful Democratic Party reform to work was to make changes in every state. Ken
Bode, President of the University of South Dakota Young Democrats, had been appointed
by McGovern as Staff Assistant. Bode organized interns to research each state’s rules,
much like the report of the Hughes Commission, in respect to “intrastate apportionment
of convention delegates, the timing of the delegate selection process, the status of party
rules, mechanisms for ballot listing, quorum and proxy rules, and eligibility requirements
for voting.”50
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With a strong executive committee and the establishment of subcommittees, the
Commission would ultimately consider recommendations during a two-day session in
September 1969 in the Dirksen Senate Office Building. Drawing from the Hughes
Commission and personal experiences, Ken Bode and Eli Segal worked with commission
staff to draft guidelines to submit to the Committee. Additionally, staff used information
from the Model Delegate Subcommittee, which political scientist Byron Shafer described
as “Segal’s first attempt at codifying his own thoughts on the reform of delegate
selection.”51
Among the biggest debates over the final rules was whether or not establishing
delegate selection based on proportionality was the desired intent of the reform
resolutions passed by the convention. Knowing how contentious debate on
proportionality could be, commission staff chose to identify the provisions as
“Representation of Minority Views” in hopes that it would avoid provoking conflict
before discussion. 52
The Commission ultimately decided that they had not been “required” to establish
such rules, but in a narrow vote, voted to implement them. Harold Hughes had been
chairing the meeting at the time, and broke parliamentary rules to vote for them. A tie
resulted, and the commission authorized more research. 53
When the commission resumed in late 1969, debate on the idea of proportionality
was still fiery. Fred Dutton, who was a strong believer in the winner-take-all system of
his home state of California, believed that the excitement of such a meaningful contest
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would serve to turn out dispirited Democrats. 54 After a debate on whether or not specific
states should follow a formula, George Mitchell offered compromise language that would
ultimately become the commission’s position. From Shafer’s Quiet Storm:
After a minimum of additional debate, Mitchell’s original motion, in its
restated version – “recommending” some form of proportionality for 1972;
asking the 1972 Convention to “require” some form thereafter – was
finally called. With a vote of 10 yes and 5 no, the motion passed, and the
commission had an official position on the adequate representation of
minority views….[Utah Governor Rampton] was so incensed that he
swore to prevent Guideline B-6 from ever becoming party law in Utah.”55
Another major and controversial reform to come out of from the Commission on
Party Structure and Delegate Selection was language in recommendations A-1 and A-2
which required the party to “overcome the effects of past discrimination” to encourage
participation of minorities, women, and youth, groups that had been shut out of previous
conventions. If the convention were to make the nominating process more reflective,
reflectivity was not necessarily just about how, but who cast their ballot.
Segal’s Model Delegate Subcommittee language had contained strong language
urging that underrepresented groups should have language in proportion to their
statewide proportion.56 By the time that a full proposal came before the Commission,
some were hesitant about the idea of a quota system.
Commission member Austin Ranney not only supported the addition of language
that recommended affirmative action goals, but pushed McGovern and the commissions
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to go back on an earlier decision by the commission not to publicly support a quota
system:
…Ranney insisted that the commission should “at least urge…that
members of minority groups be adequately, fairly…represented.” He
added, though, that the commission should not require such representation
“because that would mean quotas.”57

Following sentiments by Senator Bayh that minorities in delegate selection should
be reflective of its share of a state population, Professor Samuel Beer moved that states
be required to “encourage minority group participation.” Bayh proposed an amendment
to add the phrase “in reasonable relationship to their appearance in a state’s population as
a whole,” which had been written for him by commission consultant Dick Wade. 58 Both
the Beer and Bayh motions passed. With many commissioners still concerned,
McGovern later suggested that the Commission formally state that these guidelines were
not to be viewed as support for a quota system,59 and a footnote was added to the
commission report, stating that “It is the understanding of the Commission that this is not
to be accomplished by the mandatory imposition of quotas.”60 Though the “minority”
groups referred to racial minorities, Fred Dutton later moved that women and young
people be included.61
Implementation was not necessarily an easy step. After all, party rules changes
were necessary on a local level. In talking with Chairman Fred Harris, it was established
57

McGovern, Grassroots, 145.
Shafer, The Quiet Storm, 167-168.
59
McGovern, Grassroots, 148.
60
Mandate for Reform, 40.
61
White, The Making of the President, 1972, 3.
58

23

that the Commission, as a creation of the 1968 Democratic National Convention, was to
report to the 1972 convention, the states, and the Democratic National Committee.62
The resignation of Fred Harris as party chair gave the commission an opportunity
to speed up the process; without knowledge of what the new (and former) chair,
Lawrence O’Brien would do in regards to the reform effort, funding for the printing and
circulation of the report was secured from the more liberal of the labor groups, the
UAW;63 the Commission included a provision in the report stating that as authority had
come from the 1968 convention and was therefore “binding on the states.”64
The Commission ultimately received the support of the Democratic National
Committee. The party’s executive committee endorsed them in 1970 and included them
in the call to the 1972 convention. 65 Some had feared that Democratic National
Committeeman George Mitchell and former Texas State Democratic Executive
Committee Chairman Will Davis would attempt to issue a minority report, due to a belief
that the commission had overreached the authority of individual states. Dodds believed
that the potential candidacy of Ed Muskie in 1972 served to dissuade Mitchell, as it
would risk Muskie’s ability to gain the support of reformers. Shafer speculated that
Davis, who was not re-appointed as Chair in Texas after John Connally left office in early
1969, “lacked the institutional base from which to mount such a response.” 66
George McGovern resigned his post as chair to run for president, but the
commission work continued through new Chairman Donald Fraser. Through Fraser, the
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commission worked to help states through a compliance process and Ken Bode began a
private organization, the Center for Political Reform, to work from the outside to make
states compliant. By the 1972 convention, 98.3% of delegates had been elected in a
transparent process, the percentage of minorities had substantially increased, and all fifty
states had adopted new party rules. 67
Come Home, America
Believing that there was a tremendous void in party leadership, McGovern was
adamant on announcing his candidacy early. “There was no Adlai Stevenson as titular
head of the party-in-opposition,” wrote McGovern campaign manager Gary Hart, a
Colorado lawyer. 68 Having chaired the Commission on Delegate Selection and Party
Structure, McGovern certainly had the credentials to be considered a major mover in the
Democratic Party.
Ed Muskie had done virtually everything right in positioning himself for a bid for
the Democratic nomination in 1972. After returning to the U.S. Senate, Muskie made an
unsuccessful bid for the position of Senate Democratic whip, losing out to Senator Ted
Kennedy. On the eve of the 1970 mid-term elections, Muskie gave the Democratic
Party’s televised address to the nation from Kennebunkport, ME. By the time he had
become an official candidate, the man who had joined Hubert Humphrey on the platform
in Chicago stood firmly with the left of the Democratic Party on Vietnam, with his
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campaign literature reading “Not the escalation. An end. Now. Some people think the
war is over. It isn’t.”69
According to McCarthy-turned-Muskie operative Lanny Davis:
He [Muskie] understood from the start, however, that such a strategy
would inevitably place him in an ideological and factional cross fire
between New Politics purists and liberals on the one hand, and the party
regulars, organized labor, and conservative factions on the other. But,
remembering what he had achieved in Maine, Muskie was confident that
he could survive the cross-fire. In the end, the need to defeat Richard
Nixon would convince the most hostile foes to put down their weapons
and work together. At least, that’s what he thought.70
But, despite competing in all major nominating contests,71 bringing on individuals
like Lanny Davis, a Connecticut supporter of Eugene McCarthy in 1968, and earning the
support of now-Senator Harold Hughes, Ed Muskie’s campaign still had the makings of a
pre-reform effort. Gary Hart’s analysis:
Muskie’s campaign was clearly and explicitly based on a plan to create the
image of a “winner” as unstoppable frontrunner, and to bolster that image
by assiduously seeking the support of elected officials whose
endorsements would be able to produce voters at the polls…We did not
believe this strategy would work, partly because we had no choice and
partly because we thought we had entered a political period when the
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people at large were not about to be told by their political leaders whom to
support or for whom to vote…As it turned out, all the endorsements meant
very little.72

According to Davis, McGovern had a good handle on the fact that “the 1968
campaign offered a New Politics-backed candidate important advantages.” In addition to
activists left over from the Kennedy and McCarthy campaigns, Davis argued that
McGovern’s knowledge of the McGovern-Fraser reforms could “operate to the
considerable advantage of any candidate who had the backing of a well-organized and
activist constituency, especially in a multi-candidate contest.”73
But was this new activist constituency poised to put McGovern over the top in the
new democratic nominating contests certain to support the Democratic nominee for
president in the fall? Fred Dutton, now a McGovern campaign strategist, certainly
thought so. According to historian Jefferson Cowie, Dutton “failed to see the core of
Kennedy’s appeal in the blue-collar vote – preferring to emphasize the youth; rather than
tapping into the Wallaceite’s anger, Dutton chose the most dangerous path of dismissing
it.”74
The Muskie campaign was focused on youth too, having hired Lanny Davis
specifically to work on the effort. In what Muskie scheduler Eliot Cutler called “the
beast that ate Manhattan,”75 the youth vote consumed all campaigns but did not
ultimately amount to anyone’s saving grace. In a confidential April 12, 1971 Muskie
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campaign strategy memo, Dartmouth Government Professor Frank Smallwood outlined
the promise that youth voters had:
…if we lump all of the potential 40 million voters born between 1940
and mid‐1954 together, these potential voters have been exposed to
only four major party Presidential candidates–Johnson, Goldwater,
Nixon, and Humphrey. Whatever the virtues of these four gentlemen,
they hardly represent the types of broad‐gauged, charismatic,
idealistic leaders who would be destined to stimulate a mass appeal
among many of the younger voters throughout the nation. 76
But in the McGovern camp, Dutton’s fixation on youth – and disregard for the
white, working class, and union members whom Dutton believed “just like the rest of the
nation, would be drawn to the polls on the grounds of social style, attitudes, and the
promise of liberation,”77 represented a larger pattern with McGovern strategists focusing
on mobilizing “new politics” groups rather than traditional voters. According to
McGovern staffer Frank Mankiewicz:
We were always subject to this pressure from the cause people. We
related to every threat from women, or militants, or college groups. If I
had to do it all over again, I’d learn when to tell them to go to hell. 78
But McGovern’s ability to capitalize on the mobilization of activists and the
substantial growth of nominating contests from 1968 helped to overtake frontrunner Ed
Muskie. Muskie’s campaign, built on inevitability, simply could not handle momentum.
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Second place finishes in Iowa and New Hampshire greatly undermined the
expectations set by the media for frontrunner Ed Muskie. Many believed that Muskie,
from neighboring Maine, had no choice but to earn a minimum of 50 percent of the vote
in the New Hampshire Primary. 79 Cutler characterized Muskie’s support as “a mile wide
and an inch deep; unsticky as soon as vulnerability showed.”80
Harold Pachios, a Maine attorney who coordinated efforts in California for
Muskie believes that the assertion that Muskie was running a pre-reform campaign in a
post-reform era is a “very fair assessment.” Pachios recalls:
I spent weeks and weeks between Maine and California. The whole
approach was to get every leading politician in California to endorse
Muskie and bring their ground troops with them. And we succeeded
beyond our wildest dreams – every single relevant Democrat that I can
remember declared for Muskie.81
The new rules emphasizing the “Representation of Minority Views” that had been
so important to the deliberations of the McGovern-Fraser Committee did not just make
for a more democratic vote, but created a contest that could be greatly determined by
strategy. One state greatly impacted by rules changes was Arizona, where that state’s
cumulative vote-style primary represented a different type of contest that supporters of
New York City Mayor John Lindsay were able to take advantage of. The system, which
split approximately 500 votes to the state convention into state senate districts, allowed
voters to cast as many votes as available delegates for each district.
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Lindsay organizer Arthur Kaminsky realized that a less-popular candidate could
still do very well by turning out a high vote concentration for a smaller number of
delegate candidates. Muskie’s campaign, which failed to grasp the new rules, came in
first in the Southwest contest, but once again failed to meet expectations following
Newsweek’s projection that Muskie was poised to win all delegates outright.82
Though Muskie was McGovern’s chief competitor in the early Iowa, New
Hampshire, and Arizona contests, the contest later saw the emergence of a familiar face.
In January 1972, former Vice President Hubert Humphrey declared his candidacy for
President in Philadelphia. After his 1968 loss, Humphrey had returned to Minnesota and
sought election to the U.S. Senate. During his successful bid, Humphrey pledged not to
run in 1972 for president. But the urge was too much. This time, however, Humphrey
would compete in state nominating contests; he had no choice. His presidential
announcement struck a different cord, perhaps recognizing the new constituencies needed
under the new rules to win the nomination:
The young must be full and effective partners in restoring the physical
beauty and the human vitality of America – in fulfilling Jefferson’s dream
of a people united in friendship, compassion, and mutual respect.
Jefferson was a young man when he drafted the Declaration of
Independence. Some considered him radical. But in reality he and his
fellows were true conservatives -- for above all they wished to conserve
the freedom and liberty of the individual. 83
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The McGovern campaign had initially hoped that Humphrey would enter the race,
and helped to feed the story that the Muskie campaign was scared of a potential
candidacy. Displaced Muskie supporters could move to McGovern’s campaign to block
Humphrey from getting the nomination. Humphrey’s entrance, Hart theorized, could
only help to weaken Muskie. 84
Humphrey’s first contest was the March 14 Florida Primary, performing very well
but placing a distant second with 234,658 votes (18.6%) to Alabama Governor George
Wallace’s 526,651 (41.6%). Wallace won every county. McGovern barely reached 7%
in what Theodore White described as a “perfunctory and useless try for the youth and
black vote.”85 In his autobiography, Grassroots, McGovern wrote:
…it seemed to me to demonstrated a more complex range of alienated
voters whose concerns had to be understood if the Democratic Party were
to win in 1972. I addressed myself to these concerns; to some Wallace
voters I appeared as an anti-establishment candidate to whom they could
identify….But in the end, most Wallace voters and their leader found it
difficult to identify with a liberal, Northern, antiwar Democrat surrounded
by advocates of new styles of life and social behavior. 86
The campaign continued through contest after contest, with Muskie ultimately
dropping out. The very climax of the campaign came with the June 6 California Primary,
which, thanks to a push by Fred Dutton during McGovern-Fraser Commission
deliberations, remained a winner-take-all contest. “Now, by historic irony,” wrote
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Theodore White, “in the 1972 primary, at the end of his twelve-year pursuit of the
presidency, it would be left to Hubert Humphrey, the dreamer, to shove the reality of
American life and government as it really was against the new dreamer and preacher of
1972, George McGovern, and thereby begin McGovern’s destruction.”87
Running out of money, Humphrey decided that accepting a televised debate with
McGovern was a smart strategy. With polls showing McGovern leading the former Vice
President by twenty points in the polls, the two went to television for a brutal debate. On
election night in California, McGovern bested Humphrey by 5 points.
In what McGovern would later call a “totally unjustified and suicidal challenge,”
Humphrey became a part of a stop-McGovern movement with many of the other
unsuccessful candidates to deprive the South Dakota Senator of the nomination by
requiring that California split its votes proportionally, in what they believed was
consistent with the McGovern-Fraser rules. 88 In the Credentials Committee, with
California’s ten members unable to vote, McGovern was initially stripped of 120 votes to
conform to the coalition’s demands. 89
In retaliation, over the will of McGovern and campaign manager Gary Hart,
Mayor Daley’s handpicked Chicago delegation was stripped of its seats as well. 90
Following court challenges and a ruling by the Supreme Court of the United States that
party rules could only be determined internally, the McGovern campaign saw its last
hope as overturning the Credentials Committee’s decision in Miami, where the full
convention would vote to sustain or appeal its recommendations. Following the ruling
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that McGovern’s 120 delegates would be allowed to cast their votes on the decision, (and
some serious politicking by Richard Stearns)91 the convention would vote in favor of
McGovern’s California delegates.
Humphrey friend Fred Harris believed that Humphrey’s involvement in the
“Anybody But McGovern” movement “hindered the healing of Democratic lesions and
helped seal the doom of McGovern’s general-election campaign against Richard
Nixon.”92
The “Stop McGovern” movement had not been limited to Humphrey delegates at
the convention. Days before the California Primary, Southern Governors led by Jimmy
Carter of Georgia, assembled to discuss ways to stop McGovern from winning the
nomination. Ironically, just four years later, Carter would use McGovern’s rules and
precedence to win the nomination himself.
Ultimately, McGovern finally prevailed, giving his acceptance speech to the
Democratic convention at 3:00AM, with most viewers watching on television having
gone to sleep hours and hours before. Unable to convince Senator Ted Kennedy to join
him on the ticket, McGovern tapped Missouri Senator Tom Eagleton to join him on the
ticket. When word broke that Eagleton had been treated for depression using shock
therapy, McGovern dumped Eagleton for a Kennedy cousin, former Ambassador
Sargeant Shriver; a rocky start for both Democratic tickets.
George McGovern attracted a significant number of young, ethnically diverse,
and female delegates in his quest for the Democratic nomination. These individuals, in a
large way reflective of the new changes to Democratic Party rules, helped to catapult
91
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George McGovern to the nomination – but this “new politics” coalition was not enough
to put McGovern over the top in November. Was this coalition to blame for the
nominee’s defeat in 1972? According to Gallup, a staggering 33% of Democrats and
57% of blue-collar workers voted for Richard Nixon in 1972.93 Traditional Democrats
were completely at war with the “new politics faction,” with Harold Pachios recalling:
I think that the Muskie people all liked it the old way, when the party
bosses ran the show. And McGovern just latched on to protest – and
reaction against authority – were of course at the top of the agenda in
those days. That was the anti-war movement and young people were
protesting and so there was an anti-establishment feeling in the party. 94
McGovern campaign manager Gary Hart believes that there is no direct
correlation between McGovern’s primary election success and general election disaster.
“Running for president is two very distinct campaigns. One is winning the [party]
nomination; one is winning the general [election]. How you do the first one is almost
totally different from the separate one,” recalls Hart. “If you run a grassroots campaign
and are successful under new participatory rules, you have demonstrated an appeal inside
the party among those who are active Democrats but then you still have to go out to the
electorate at large and convince a large number of Democrats and even Democrats who
did not participate or who supported some other candidate to support you. Totally a
separate undertaking.”95
Of the 1972 nomination fight, then-DCCC Chairman Tip O’Neill later recalled:
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All of us were bitter at what we had just witnessed. The convention was
filled with first-time delegates, mostly women and minorities who spent
the bulk of their time fighting over the various planks of the party
platform. Because they were new to the system, these people failed to
understand that the real purpose of a platform is to express a general
philosophy and to be as inclusive as possible. Instead, they seemed eager
to come up with a document that would be taken literally. For once, I
agreed with those critics who speak of occasional suicidal tendencies
among the Democrats.96
Whether or not George McGovern unfairly took advantage of the rules to win the
nomination is a contentious issue for many. Regardless, the 1972 fight for the
nomination saw a victorious McGovern prevail over candidates unable to adapt their style
or existing infrastructure to the demands of a new system. Most importantly, perhaps, the
1972 fight set the stage for the fight to come between those who wished to further open
the process and elected officials hoping to reassert their influence.
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2| Responses to Reform

“The thing that’s so great about us, our pluralism,
is the thing that gets us screwed up when we try to make rules.”
- Baltimore City Councilor Barbara Mikulski, 1973

Jean Westwood, a former McGovern campaign advisor, became Chair of the
Democratic National Committee after McGovern won the Democratic nomination. As
one of first her major acts, Westwood appointed a commission to re-examine the
McGovern-Fraser rules.

The 1973 Delegate Selection Commission, chaired by

Baltimore City Councilor Barbara Mikulski, was another large commission at 73
members, with key players including Ohio Governor John Gilligan, Gary, Indiana Mayor
Richard Hatchner, Ken Bode, and activist Ann Lewis. Gilligan described the
commissioners, who would write the 1976 delegate selection rules, as “Individuals
throughout the party, state, and the nation who were very interested in bringing the
Democratic Party up to date and join the new world.”97
Heeding calls for her resignation, Jean Westwood stepped aside after the 1972
general election. At the urging of Senator Lloyd Bentsen and former Governor John
Connally, Robert Strauss, a Texan, was appointed as new party chair. Rowland Evans
and Robert Novak described Strauss as a Chair planning to be “increasingly critical of the
reformers,” and willing to “appeal to Democratic National Committee to reverse
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commission decisions.”98 But Strauss’s committee appointments got along reasonably
well with the rest of the commission, avoiding majorly divisive debates.99 There still
were, however, bitter clashes between reformers and the party establishment. 100
While the intricacies of the Mikulski Commission are not as well-documented as
the groundbreaking McGovern-Fraser commission, they are not, perhaps, as crucial to
understanding the commission’s impact. In reality, the Mikulski Commission’s biggest
contribution to the party reform movement was simply choosing to uphold the work of
the McGovern-Fraser Commission.
According to Crotty:
Surprisingly, as the commission deliberations evolved, it became clear that
the balance of the group felt the intent of the guidelines to be good and the
rules themselves relatively equitable and reasonable. 101
The rules were not entirely left intact. One of the biggest changes made by the
Mikulski Commission was the elimination of the so-called “quotas.” McGovern, who
had never pushed for such a system, speaking before the Commission, said that the
reforms “did not fail,” but that “we need not pretend that the reforms were written in
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stone.” Of course, most in the press thought that McGovern himself had been responsible
for the changes. 102
In establishing the rules for the 1976 convention, the commission had called for
efforts to encourage minority participation, but explicitly stated “mandatory quotas may
not be imposed.” Viewed as a substantial victory, Gilligan, the Chair of the drafting
committee, encouraged Democratic Governors to endorse the reformed rules ahead of the
party’s 1974 mid-term convention. The motion introduced by outgoing Governor
Gilligan was made by the new Governor-elect of Massachusetts, Michael Dukakis. The
unanimous vote of the new rules package even included the support of Alabama Gov.
George Wallace. 103
The doors to the Democratic Party remained open, despite the elimination of
quotas. Other minor reforms, however, would cause serious consequences in the years
ahaead. The Commission also voted to mandate proportionality, but implemented an
important requirement:
Delegations at all levels must be divided according to the expressed
preferences receiving at least 15% support of the voters in binding
primaries and of participants in caucuses or conventions. In primary states
with no binding presidential preference poll, delegates must be elected to
units no larger than a Congressional district.104
While reformers wanted purely proportional races, there were strong reasons
against this sort of system, even among those who were a significant part of the
McGovern reform movement. In addition to the difficulties that would be required in
102
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changing some state laws, there was a compelling reason: George Wallace. Harvard
Professor Elaine Kamarack, who played a key role in several party reform commissions,
suggests in Primary Politics that “loophole primaries,” which allowed for direct election
of delegate slates on the district level (a well-organized candidate could generally carry
all of the delegates in the district) were primarily preserved because it was believed other
candidates could serve to outperform Wallace in many of the Northern industrial states
that used these systems. 105
The last major reform of the Mikulski Commission was language stating that all
candidates for president had the right to approve of their delegates. As we will see later,
these rules changes would have incredible consequences in the cycles ahead.
It is important to note that reform was not limited to delegate selection. The
O’Hara Rules Commission had met over the course of three years, 1969 to 1972, for the
purpose of establishing permanent convention rules. The Chairs of the McGovern
Commission had been insistent that the effort be completely separate.106 Another
Commission met during the Mikulski era. Chaired by North Carolina Governor Terry
Sanford, the Charter Commission wrote the formal document that became heart and soul
of the Democratic Party. While these separate commissions had separate authority and
jurisdiction, they contributed to the emerging nationalization of the Democratic Party.
The Magnitude of Response
Did the Mikulski Commission respond appropriately to the challenges that had
been encountered in the 1972 contest? While George McGovern’s 1972 bid is often
portrayed as a shoestring campaign made up of quotas of fringe Democrats who did not
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connect with the general electorate, those who supported McGovern in the fall of 1972
were not extraordinarily different from those who supported his Miami Convention
nemesis, Hubert Humphrey, in 1968.
McGovern carried about two million fewer votes that Hubert Humphrey did in
1968, and lost the crucial union vote by a very significant ten percent. He lost four points
among men, seven among women, and another seven among blue-collar workers. While
these numbers and McGovern’s six-point drop among whites (and two-point jump among
nonwhites) contribute to the compelling notion that the nominee’s campaign was out of
touch with the mainstream of the electorate. Humphrey’s failure to even come close to
carrying a majority of the white vote in 1968 raises the question of whether any other
Democratic candidate could have attracted the support necessary to defeat the Nixon
machine in 1972. With polls suggesting that four out of five Wallace votes would have
gone to Nixon in 1968 if the Alabama Governor was not in the race, the Democratic
Party’s problems were deeper than the South Dakota Senator’s coalition.
While analysis has shown that many of those within the Democratic Party
considered to be “Wallacites” defected for Nixon in 1972, very few Democrats who
proclaimed support for Wallace had actually defected from the Democratic ticket in
1968107; Humphrey still was unable to win a majority of white voters, and barely won a
majority of blue collar workers.108 That is not to propose that the McGovern-Fraser
reforms or the McGovern campaign did not serve to exacerbate the loss of white voters –
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but it does serve to discredit the notion held by many that the reforms in themselves led
to Richard Nixon’s landslide victory. 109
The McGovern-Fraser Commission received its mandate from the 1968 activists
who believed the nominating system to be undemocratic, not from those necessarily
focused on a candidate with wide general election appeal. By empowering activists and
minority voters, the Democratic Party responded proportionately to those who believed
that the political left was unfairly shut out of the 1968 convention.
Gary Hart believes that “of all those considered for the presidency in 1972, only
George McGovern could have defeated Nixon.” 110 Holding that George Wallace had
helped to turn discontentment and fear against government institutions, Hart said that
McGovern was the best hope for the nation, but it was the Democratic Party as an
institution, not the candidate, that failed in 1972:
In recent decades, progressive ideas and innovative proposals have sprung
in large part from the liberal wing of the Democratic Party. The
Democratic Party, and the progressive thinkers in its liberal wing, have
provided most of the grist for the governmental mill since the days of
Roosevelt. Liberals propose and conservatives oppose. Although
McGovern himself had excellent insights into the general mood of the
electorate, it was apparent throughout the campaign that the fount of
specific proposals and programs were running dry…by 1972, American
liberalism was near bankruptcy…The liberal leadership in many states has
become so severed from the problems of the working man, that ordinary
109
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foot-soldier of the Democratic armies, that it skirts obsolescence and
irrelevance. 111
Perhaps the McGovern-Fraser reforms had produced an unelectable candidate.
George McGovern could barely hold on to his Democratic Party base, let alone attract the
independents who had supported Wallace. Hart and McGovern viewed them as essential,
and McGovern had attempted to attract them early in the primary season. “In the end,”
McGovern wrote, “most Wallace voters and their leader found it difficult to identify with
a liberal, Northern, antiwar Democrat surrounded by advocates of new styles of life and
social behavior.”112 The decision of the Mikulski Commission to end demographic
quotas was the embrace of the belief that requiring quotas played a significant role in
McGovern’s loss.
The Mikulski Commission’s defining recommendation, the decision not to reverse
the McGovern-Fraser proportionality findings, stands as its most significant contribution
to the party reform movement. The implementation of a minimum threshold to minimize
fringe candidates and shorten a divisive process was a proportional response – but the
decision to minimize a potential 1976 Wallace candidacy was, in many ways, pushing out
a bloc that Democrats needed to win back the White House.

Protecting the Incumbent: The Winograd Commission
DNC Chairman Strauss knew of the divide within the Democratic Party. Even as
the dust of the Mikulski Commission settled, party regulars were still reeling from 1972
and the “New Politics” takeover. In January 1976, Strauss assembled a team of political
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scientists and others, with the hopes of studying the idea that participatory reforms had
been bad for the Democrats’ general election chances before the 1976 contest.
To Chair the Commission on the Future of Presidential Primaries, Strauss turned
to Morley Winograd, the young Chair of the Michigan Democratic Party, a product of the
reform movement, and an officer in the Association of State Democratic Chairs. 113
Initially, the Commission was tasked with conducting a study of the extraordinary
proliferation of state primary contests, which had stood at 16 in 1968 and had climb to 30
by the 1976 contest. Commission members were not necessarily for a “national
primary,” and as South Carolina Chairman Donald Fowler reportedly said during the
commission hearings, “the primary process as such is destructive of party cohesion.
When candidates get elected because they’re on the tube, they’re responsible to
everybody. And therefore, they’re responsible to nobody.” 114
Interestingly, the commission ultimately found that primaries, for the most part,
were representative of the party mainstream. 115 In many ways, caucuses, which had been
preferred by party insiders, were seen to be at least as unrepresentative as primaries could
be.116 At the 1976 convention, the Winograd Commission was tasked with a new
direction: writing the rules for the 1980 election.
The 1976 contest, in which an outsider, Georgia Governor James Earl “Jimmy”
Carter, had not only managed to win the White House, but win the nomination early,
avoiding a divisive floor fight, proved that the existing system could nominate a winning
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candidate. When the Winograd Commission reconvened, for the first time, the
Democratic Party had the opportunity to write new rules with an incumbent at 1600
Pennsylvania Avenue.
The Carter White House was given the authority of appointing additional
members numbering about one-third of the existing committee. Tom Donilon, who had
served as Carter’s 1976 delegate counter, was selected as the White House’s point
person, according to Winograd, “to take the lead in identifying rules that the Carter folks
thought would make their renomination easier.”
While most of the political scientists originally appointed to the commission to
research the primary system lost interest, active reformers still had their priorities.
According to Kamarack:
Fulfilling the worst fears of organized labor, they also proposed [to the
Rules Committee] that the commission be required to implement a rule
that had the effect of banning loophole primaries and thereby requiring
across-the-board proportional representation for the 1980 primary
season. 117
The motion, to the dismay of many, passed. But the focus of Carter’s appointees,
from the beginning, was to help the President win re-election. The Carter White House
believed that it would face a substantial primary challenge in 1980, and for good reason,
according to Morley Winograd:
Carter was never considered one of us – by those of us in the
establishment - many of us were dreaming of a Kennedy resurrection for
many, many years – and whether it was [Ted] Kennedy, Hubert
117
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Humphrey, or Scoop Jackson, all of whom more or less presented a
challenge in the elections of 1972 or 1976, they were all more or less
“anybody but Carter” kind of candidates because…Carter’s liberal
credentials were quite suspect…a lot of the rules discussed at the 1976
convention were kind of to test Carter’s positions on mainstream
Democratic thought.118
As early as 1977, speculation was that someone like Gov. Jerry Brown of
California or Sen. Pat Moynihan of New York would pose a primary challenge. 119 The
Democratic Party, which had been invaded by outsiders in 1968, had nominated back-toback outsider candidates. In many ways, Jimmy Carter’s ability to govern would be
greatly tested by his outsider status. The struggle between party regulars and the Carter
White House was perfectly evidenced by the early resignation of Democratic National
Committee Chairman Ken Curtis, a former Governor of Maine. As Washington Post
coverage summed up his resignation, “The mild-mannered Curtis was criticized as a
weak leader who exercised too little control over the party machinery and was unable to
translate White House wishes into party actions.” 120
According to Winograd, “Within the first year [Curtis] was knocked out as party
chairman by a coalition of party chairs, me among them, and unions who believed that he
was too much of a tool of Jimmy Carter.”121
The addition of seasoned Minnesota Senator Walter Mondale, some had thought,
might help Carter’s chances in actually leading the nation. To that, Mondale, according
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to historian Jefferson Cowie, had almost resigned “because of what he believed was
Carter’s abandonment of the Democratic Party’s commitment to the material needs of the
working and poor people.”122
Despite Carter’s struggles, the White House still believed that it had the most pull
with the party establishment. Carter supporters successfully lobbied Winograd
Commission members for addition of 10% new Party Leader Elected Officials (“PL/EO)
delegate slots to help bring elected officials into the fold. Of course, the expectation was
that they would support the incumbent.123 The move would be amplified and have dire
consequences in later election cycles.
No one posed a bigger threat to Jimmy Carter in 1980 than Senator Ted Kennedy.
Interestingly, Jimmy Carter’s plan for his first bid for the White House had initially
depended on the idea that the Massachusetts Senator would run for president. Carter had
hoped to take on Kennedy head-to-head in his first race for the Presidency, believing that
a Kennedy-cleared field would give Carter the chance to directly and successfully
challenge the bearer of the Camelot torch. 124
Carter’s fears were well founded. By 1977, Kennedy had already joined the most
vocal critics of Jimmy Carter, including George McGovern. During a major speech
before the United Auto Workers, Kennedy said that Carter had done virtually nothing for
his life’s cause of national health insurance. 125 Disappointed with Carter’s failure to
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deliver on healthcare, the United Auto Workers launched an effort to coordinate the labor
efforts of the Draft Kennedy movement.126
“Even in his own state of Georgia, Jimmy Carter was an outsider,” said Morley
Winograd. “He beat the liberal establishment’s standard bearer in a Democratic Primary
for Governor…and when he ran for President, he appealed to more traditionally liberal
Democrats by saying he was the only one who could beat George Wallace in a
Primary…but he was never considered “one of us” by those of us in the establishment
who had been dreaming of a Kennedy resurrection for many, many years.” 127
With a challenge all but certain, the Winograd Commission, now heavily
influenced by pro-Carter influences, believed they needed to act fast. With loophole
primaries, gone, the White House began pushing the concept of a “sliding-window,”
which would see the minimum threshold required to carry delegates at a slowly
increasing level. The concept, of course, would make it more difficult for candidates to
accumulate delegates as they increased momentum. After an uproar of public criticism,
the window was replaced with a “floating threshold,” requiring candidates to attain
enough support to elect one delegate. In a four delegate district, for example, a candidate
would need to attain at least 25% of support to earn a vote.128
In addition to the floating threshold, in an effort to prevent contests from
“leapfrogging” each other, the DNC created a window between early March and June in
which contests could be held. Carter staff and the DNC worked to move several
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Southern States where Carter would fare well over his challengers on to the very first day
of the window, one “Super Tuesday” in March.129
Perhaps the most consequential change to come out of the Winograd Commission
was the addition of a “bound delegate rule,” requiring that delegates elected to support a
candidate cast their ballot for that candidate at the national convention. Attributed to the
need to eliminate confusion between contrasting state and national rules on a delegate’s
commitment to vote for a candidate, the commission implemented the controversial Rule
11(H):
All delegates to the National Convention shall be bound to vote for the
presidential candidate whom they were first elected to support for at least
the first Convention ballot, unless released in writing by the presidential
candidate. Delegates who seek to violate this rule may be replaced with
an alternate of the same presidential preference by the presidential
candidate or that candidate’s authorized representative(s) at any time up to
and including the presidential balloting at the National convention. 130
In many ways, the “bound delegate rule” had its roots in rules for the preceding
nomination fight, which allowed candidates to approve of their own delegates. This new
rule had more bite – virtually assuring that a candidate who had acquired the requisite
number of delegates for nomination on the first ballot would receive the nomination
unchallenged. The provision was later dubbed the “robot rule” by Kennedy supporters,
for Carter supporters’ automatic and unwavering support of their candidate.
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The Dream Shall Never Die
The White House strategy in holding off Kennedy was effective. Kennedy did not
peak until late in the campaign season, winning 5 out of the final 8 contests (including the
major California Primary). By blowing Kennedy out of the water in early Southern
contests and keeping the count close in states more favorable to Kennedy, Carter was
able to maintain a strong lead. The rules requiring proportionality greatly hurt
Kennedy’s chances. According to Kamarck:
Winner-take-all systems in the big states that Kennedy won would have
made an enormous difference in the delegate count and therefore in the
way that the Kennedy candidacy was perceived…Kennedy would have
pulled ahead of Carter after the Pennsylvania primary if the four large
industrial states that he won (excluding Massachusetts, his home state, and
Michigan, a caucus state) had used a winner-take-all allocation system. 131
Despite a late surge, Carter had an insurmountable lead among pledged delegates.
Kennedy supporters had hoped to provoke a floor fight, but the so-called “robot rule”
prevented this. Still, Kennedy supporters decided to fight it, with Kennedy putting Sen.
George McGovern at the helm of his convention fight. After an unsuccessful attempt to
change the rule in the pre-convention meeting of the Rules Committee, supporters filed a
minority report and put forth a major challenge to unbind delegates.
A group of 40 members of Congress, including Senate majority leader Robert
Byrd, New York Governor Hugh Carey, and several activists, invested $200,000 into an
“open convention” movement, with the intent of drafting recently appointed Secretary of
State Ed Muskie or another candidate into the race. Carter delegates stood by their
131
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candidate, however, and neither Kennedy’s challenge nor the “open convention”
movement ever stood a chance. 132
Jimmy Carter left the New York Convention as the nominee of his party and was
trounced in November. While political scientist William Mayer does state that many of
the reasons for Ted Kennedy’s reluctant challenge in 1980 were the reasons for Carter’s
1980 defeat, he does believe that a divisive primary did have a significant impact on
Carter’s general election loss. Analyzing the effect of Democratic strength in the
preceding two presidential elections and divisiveness in the primary, Mayer projects that
Carter could have seen a 5.3% boost in his general election share without a divisive
contest, nearly cutting his popular vote deficit in half. There is no reason to believe that
this could have resulted in a strong Carter victory, but it could have softened his fortyfour state loss.133
Ironically, while the preceding commissions had worked to open the nominating
process to outsiders, it was an outsider, Jimmy Carter, whose inability to work with
counterparts and rivals in Washington shut Democrats out of the process in an effort to
bolster his own re-election chances. While the nominating process was still vastly more
democratic than it had been only twelve years before, a long shot, outsider candidate had
caused the pendulum to swing backward, and the reforms that would follow would not
reverse the motion.
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What Kind of Response?
Determining whether or not the Winograd Commission reforms were
proportionate response to problems posed in the 1972 and 1976 contests is problematic.
While the reforms, which had a profound impact on preventing a Kennedy nomination in
1980, did attempt to address serious concerns and perceived flaws in the nominating
process, most reforms simply reflected White House’s desire to protect the incumbent.
Near-universal proportionality cost Ted Kennedy greatly in 1980, a desire of the
framers since the beginning of the reform movement. But rules like the floating
threshold window and the bound delegate rule cannot be separated by the commission’s
direction as mandated by the 1976 convention.
The need for a floating minimum delegate threshold was attributed, by the
commission, to late primary 1976 primary victories by Idaho Sen. Frank Church and
California Gov. Jerry Brown that put party unity in danger. Yet Carter had still managed
to win the nomination well in advance of the convention. 134 As previously mentioned,
the Commission also attributed the need for the bound delegate rule to address
uncertainty as to the authority of the national convention when 26 states had their own
“bound delegate” requirement for their state delegation.
Whether or not the Winograd Commission responded proportionately to
challenges faced by the 1976 contests is nearly impossible to determine, given the
commission’s mandate and split direction. But the commission represented the beginning
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of a pendulum swing, through the bound delegate rule and addition of 10% party
leader/elected official seats, back toward a closed nominating process.
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3| The Commission on Presidential Nomination
“It's very easy for the academicians – and thank G-d for ‘em – and the people who study
things and sit back and try to figure things out from afar, and who are not “down in the
pit,” as Teddy Roosevelt said. It’s easy for them to think they know exactly how things
work. If they're in there working day and night having to put together a delegation that
can get the states electoral votes, they often see things very differently from the people
who are … the people have the theories…the people who fight to be pure in a sense, they
want to be pure whether they win or not …they just want to be pure.”
-

Governor Jim Hunt

After the failed presidency of the first post-reform president, it was back to the
drawing board. This time, the Democratic Party turned to North Carolina’s popular
Democratic Governor, Jim Hunt. Not only did the Democratic Party need to take another
look at how it chose its nominees, but after the election of an outsider, address the role of
the political establishment in a changing Democratic Party. According to Hunt, “the
impression was that the super liberals had taken over the party and that a lot of the
moderates had little voice and that because of that, the Democratic Party was viewed as
being too far to the left and not mainstream.” 135 The establishment wanted back in.
In August of 1981, Hunt’s Commission on Presidential Nomination convened to
assess the rules used to nominate the party’s candidate for president. All of the
Commission’s seventy members were reviewed by Chairman Charles T. Manatt before
appointment to ensure that they were not opposed to further expanding the Winograd and
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Mikulski’ commission’s addition of elected and party officials in the decision making
process.136
Commission members were from a wide range of the political spectrum and
ranged from several members of Congress, reform foot soldiers, and party activists.
Many future members of Congress, including Maxine Waters and Anna Eshoo of
California, Robert Torricelli of New Jersey, and Julia Carson of Indiana participated in
commission proceedings. Staff Director David Price of California joined the House of
Representatives in the following cycle.
But the Commission, charged by the 1980 convention with “a complete review of
the Presidential Nomination process for the purpose of making specific recommendations
to the Democratic National Committee,” seemed to view its mandate not only as how
candidates navigated themselves to office, but how they governed their actions once
elected and serving in office:
Recent years have seen an electorate too often pulled to and fro by the
issues and personalities of the moment. Executives and legislators alike
have often chosen to “go it alone” electorally; their accountability to the
broad electorate and overall coherence of government have suffered
accordingly. Party politics – the politics of personal contact, deliberative
judgment, coalition and compromise – have too often been replaced by
remote-control campaigns, single-issue crusades, and faceless
government.137

136

Crotty, Party Reform, 89.
Commission on Presidential Nomination, Report of the Commission on Presidential
Nomination, (1982), 2.
137

54

While the commission, which had completed its survey and recommendations
within six months of its convening, was short-lived, its recommendations had perhaps the
most substantial effect on a presidential race since the reform movement began.
As with the Winograd Commission, the new commission members were
concerned with the proliferation of party nominating contests. According to Crotty,
“there is an intrinsic – although, it is argued here, false – sense of security and economy
in placing limits on the delegate selection period.” While limiting the window, as Crotty
establishes, would do nothing to shorten the pre-nomination campaign, the Winograd
Commission endorsed virtually the same window that Kennedy, Brown, and Carter had
faced in 1980. 138
Additionally, the Commission wished to add “flexibility” to the convention,
allowing states to determine just how delegates fit into the “fair reflection” category
established by previous reform commissions. In addition to setting a firm 20 percent
minimum threshold in caucus states and 25 percent in primary contests, the commission
reinstated winner-take-all primaries on the district level (“loophole” contests).139140
Perhaps the most famous and consequential result of the Hunt Commission was
the establishment of so-called “Super Delegates,” formally “Party and Elected Official”
Delegates. The recommendation increased the number of unelected delegates from 8% to
22% of the approximately 3,000 delegates that were projected to attend the 1984
convention.
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According to the Commission Report, only 14% of Democratic Senators and 14%
of Democratic House members attended the 1980 convention. “The 10% add-on was too
small to include most such officials,” the report writes of Democratic Congressmen,
Senators, and Mayors, “so they faced the unattractive prospect of running against their
own constituents if they wanted to become delegates. And even those included in the
add-on were required to make an early declaration of presidential preference as a
condition of eligibility – a declaration that many of them were understandably reluctant
to make.”141
In addition to allocating 550 unelected delegates to party and elected officials,
Rule 8 established “a process whereby the House Democratic Caucus and Senate
Democratic Caucus would select up to 3/5 of their number to serve as delegates.” These
appointments would be factored into state delegate counts, and members’ previously
declared statements of support for specific candidates would not factor into their
eligibility. According to the Commission Report:
Why so much stress on increasing party and elected official participation?
The Commission regards this as an important way to increase the
convention’s representativeness of mainstream Democratic constituencies.
It would help restore peer review to the process, subjecting candidates to
scrutiny by those who know them best. It would put a premium on
coalition building within the party prior to nomination, the forming of
alliances that would help us campaign and govern effectively. It would
strengthen party ties among officials, giving them a greater sense of
141
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identification with the nominee and the platform. And the presence of
unpledged delegates would help return decision-making discretion and
flexibility to the convention.142
According to Chairman Gov. Jim Hunt, despite the focus on young people,
women, minorities, and other represented groups in other reform efforts, “what was being
left out were the party leaders and officeholders – Democrats who had been elected by
people and represented the citizens broadly.”
The so-called “super delegates,” as Hunt points out, were not simply individuals
who felt that they had earned a voice in decision making. Much like the endorsements
that candidates like Ed Muskie had spent trying to court in 1972, these individuals held
clout with their constituencies. Many of them spoke to newly enfranchised
constituencies within the Democratic Party. Former Vice President Walter Mondale, the
eventual 1984 nominee for President, understood that super delegates were not simply
about their vote:
…despite the intentions of the ’72 rules, it was the regular Democrats that
go to their caucuses, that are involved in the politics of their community
and their state who still were the main participants in their primary and
precinct caucuses and I always thought you had to appeal to them, get
their support, and so do the–what we call Super delegates out here–the
people that were in Congress, people that were in the legislature, people in
the Senate, people in Mayors, local offices, and so on–that makes up quite
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a group. They all have their own constituencies and ways of influencing
voting and so I spent a lot of time working with them. 143

A Candidate with Hart
In 1984, Democrats would have an opportunity at taking down an incumbent
elected Republican president for the first time since Richard Nixon occupied the White
House. The race drew out candidates seen as formidable – legendary Astronaut-turnedOhio Senator John Glenn, former Vice President Walter Mondale of Minnesota, and
Senator Paul Simon of Illinois. Long-shot candidates Sen. Gary Hart of Colorado and the
Rev. Jesse Jackson of Chicago, Illinois joined the race as well. But the strangest player
in that year’s Democratic Primary was George McGovern.
After losing 49 states to Richard Nixon in 1972, George McGovern was
successful in convincing the voters of South Dakota to send him back to Washington in
1974. McGovern would lose re-election to Congressman James Abdnor during the
election of 1980. No one two years earlier could have predicted that McGovern would
make another bid for the presidency in 1984. As strange as it was to see an elder
statesman and former nominee trying to become a modern-day Adlai Stevenson or
William Jennings Bryan, McGovern was in the race.
McGovern’s candidacy may have seemed abnormal to the general electorate, but
it was perhaps the most bizarre to McGovern’s 1972 campaign manager, Sen. Gary Hart:
It was strange to say the least. I had never quite understood it. McGovern
said afterwards that he didn’t think I was going to do well when he got in
the race. But he didn’t do well in New Hampshire and he was running a
143

Walter Mondale, interviewed by author, via telephone, November 18, 2010.

58

one-state campaign – his only state from ‘72 – but there had never been a
situation where someone who had worked for one candidate then found
himself running 12 years later only to have the person run against him. By
the time we got to Massachusetts, I had run second in IA, won NH, had in
effect won super Tuesday, so it was confusing but I felt my campaign was
on a roll and continued beyond that to win – 25 or 26 caucuses and
primaries and Senator McGovern just dropped out. It was awkward.144
Like McGovern himself twelve years earlier, Hart would soon find himself the
outsider candidate running against the favorite of the political establishment. Not only
did Walter Mondale have the early endorsements – like support from the National
Education Association in September of 1983 – he had the influential support of super
delegates.
In February of 1984, the U.S. House of Representatives Democratic Caucus
selected its delegates to attend the Democratic National Convention in San Francisco. Of
the caucus’ allegiance, 95 delegates were allocated to Walter Mondale (including
influential Speaker of the House Tip O’Neill), 18 to John Glenn, 12 to California Senator
Alan Cranston, 8 to the Rev. Jesse Jackson, 4 to former Florida Governor Reuben Askew,
and 3 to South Carolina Senator Fritz Hollings. While officially, no candidates were
“committed,” 20 delegates specifically went undesignated. 145
The Democratic Party nomination in 1984 was Walter Mondale’s for the taking.
Maine, set to caucus after Iowa and New Hampshire, held its straw poll in fall 1983;
Mondale took 939 votes for 51% of the vote. Gary Hart took 1%. To top it off, the AFL144
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CIO broke its policy of not getting involved in a Democratic Primary, and threw its
support behind the protégé of Hubert Humphrey. 146
By the end of 1983, Mondale had raised more than $11.4 million, but spent most
of it, and would qualify for $4 million federal matching funds the following February.
Perhaps nobody could have suggested that Gary Hart’s long-shot effort, which had only
raised $1.9 million by the end of the year was about to shock the political establishment.
On March 5, 1984, Gary Hart received 37% of the vote in the New Hampshire
Democratic Party, eclipsing the 28% garnered by former Vice President Mondale (not
including the 3,968 write-in votes that Hart received in the Granite State Republican
contest). Despite his momentum in New Hampshire, followed by a blowout in the Maine
caucuses, where Mondale campaigned hard, public delegate counts after back-to-back
significant wins for Hart still showed Mondale with a 143 to 29 lead; Hart was only
eleven points ahead of Ohio Senator John Glenn after causing a political earthquake in
New England. The early commitment of super delegates had given Mondale what
seemed like an insurmountable lead in the delegate count. An individual without
understanding of the system would believe that Mondale had already accumulated a
significant lead in a purely proportional system.
Hart’s momentum allowed him to carry on through Super Tuesday contests. But
new rules implemented by the Hunt Commission, including the reimplementation of
loophole primaries and the addition of “bonus delegates” to differentiate between a win
and a tie, greatly served to harm the Colorado Senator. From Studies in U.S. Politics:
In New Hampshire for example, a 10 percent margin of victory in primary
votes for Gary Hart over Walter Mondale resulted in both candidates
146
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gaining exactly the same number of ordinary and add-on delegates. In
Massachusetts, Hart only won one more ordinary delegate than Mondale
despite his 13.5 percent margin of primary votes over Mondale… 147
Some contests, like the California Primary, saw the edge in delegates go to Hart.
But the new system of rules, as designed by Mondale supporters made it virtually
impossible for an insurgent candidate to overthrow the party’s establishment candidate. 148
Despite Hart’s momentum from the early contests, Mondale’s insurmountable delegate
lead made it virtually impossible for Hart to win the nomination. Hart recalls:
“What was so remarkable, was that many had endorsed Mondale in 1984
before the votes – I had a number tell me they wished they had not
committed to Mondale because they wished they had been free to support
me to the convention – they had been whipped up for Vice President
Mondale.149
Like the contest before, there were major differences between the two candidates,
both in ideology and in personality. Hart, like McGovern before him, had tried to frame
the campaign between “old” and “new.” While quotas did not exist in the Democratic
Party, like their two mentors, Hubert Humphrey and George McGovern, the last men
standing for the Democratic Nomination in 1984 put a premium on seeking out different
groups to build a winning coalition.
In many ways, Mondale’s old-style campaign, now putting emphasis on
endorsements as the pre-reform candidates had, while holding on to traditional
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demographic groups, Hart had no choice but to run a campaign targeting a broader
audience. Mondale believes that grouping his style of politics with that of pre-reform
Democrats was an unfair characterization:
The party, and liberals particularly, were outraged over the fact that they
couldn’t get the ’68 convention to end the war–and they were outraged
over what they thought was “old politics” that prevented McGovern from
assembling the support that he needed. And these rules were designed to–
they cast it as though minorities, and blacks, and so on had been left out of
the party–and that was true, and I worked on a lot of those, as you may
know, I worked–I was central to the civil rights reforms of the democratic
party because I felt very strongly about that. But they also, they didn’t
like…they wanted the new, and they wanted to define who the new were.
And the new strangely would be who supported them; so there was a
struggle there.150
According to Gillron:
Where Mondale hoped to forge a Democratic community by binding
together the leading public-interest groups, Hart hoped to appeal to
individuals and form a consensus around specific issues.151
Mondale advisor and political strategist Joe Trippi compared Hart’s style to a
virus – that spread amongst small groups of people. Certainly, this is different than
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building coalitions of interest groups. Mondale’s old-style campaign and Hart’s “new
new politics” attracted different elements of the Democratic Party.
During the previous four election cycles, according to political scientist Samuel
Huntington, the country had undergone significant change throughout the Democratic
Party’s major periods of reform. Huntington asserted the New Deal coalition that
powered the Democratic Party had been, throughout the 1970’s, gradually replaced by a
“new stratum”:
…the control of the Democratic Party by the New Deal coalition was
challenged by the rise of new groups that had become politically
mobilized during the 1960s. The key issues for these groups were, of
course, not the Great Depression and the Cold War but civil rights and
Vietnam. This New Politics stratum eventually included blacks, youth,
women, liberal intellectuals, Hispanics, and others….by the late 1970s the
New Politics stratum had displaced the New Deal stratum as the dominant
force in the Democratic Party152
Huntington believed that this change had created the concept of “categorical
representation,” defined as the proposition that the interests of particular groups can be
properly represented only by individuals who are themselves members of those groups,
blacks by blacks, women by women, union members by union members.153
Certainly, some credibility does exist to provide support to this assertion. In the
1984 Democratic Primary, African-American Reverend Jesse Jackson had one of his
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most substantial victories, carrying 25.4% of the vote – but only 18% of his support came
from white voters.154
That is not to say that specific groups only vote for specific groups – certainly,
there were no women of note running in the 1984 contest. But Huntington’s theory does
suggest that the Democratic Party had been split into major factions.
Senator Hart does not believe that Huntington’s theory is correct, nor that it had
any bearing on the 1984 election. “People are individual people. People do not do what
leaders tell them to do – even if they are part of that leaders’ group. People are more
independent. Take ‘84 – unions were solidly for Mondale and endorsed him
categorically before the primaries began…I got majority of union voters under the age of
40 in a number of states, voting for who they identified with – beauty of secret ballot.”155
Of course, Hart points out that this assertion becomes muddled in open caucus
contests. Morley Winograd also rejects the theory, pointing to the United Auto Workers
(a key Democratic Party union) as an example, where leadership was not often always
reflective of party membership.156
An interesting narrative of the 1984 campaign was the Mondale campaign’s
attempt to circumvent campaign-spending limits through the establishments of “Delegate
Committees” during the vital Pennsylvania Primary. Led by the Philadelphia district
attorney, Ed Rendell, the at-large delegate committee began raising funds under an FEC
provision that allowed independent committees to raise funds for the election of
delegates. Like the controversy over so-called “SuperPACs” several decades later,
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Mondale’s campaign was accused of loose coordination with the Pennsylvania campaign
efforts led by individuals like campaign veteran Joe Trippi. Not only did the committee
stand to jeopardize campaign finance restrictions, it took a slew of labor money, violating
Mondale’s pledge not to take PAC money. According to Paul Jensen, a former Carter
Administration bureaucrat:
We would have lost Pennsylvania without labor’s activity in Mondale’s
behalf. They did more in this presidential election than they have ever
done, even exceeding the effort in behalf of Humphrey in 1968. 157
With favorable rules, super delegates, and support from loyal traditional
constituencies like organized labor (59% of Hart voters believed that unions had too
much power), Mondale pulled off a narrow win. 158 But how deep was the divide between
the politics of “the old” and “the new,” split between Hart and Mondale, eerily
reminiscent of the fight their mentors had fought only 12 years prior? Thirty-three
percent of Hart primary voters voted for Republican incumbent Ronald Reagan in the
fall. Mondale’s lock on traditional Democratic constituencies may have been enough to
win the primary, but not the general election.
Mondale beat Gary Hart for the nomination by two points among men and four
points among women. But wealthier voters and those under age 44 strongly supported
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Hart. While union households favored Mondale by fourteen points, those without a
union member gave the edge to Hart.159
With Mondale’s edge among traditional Democratic constituencies, one might
believe that any semblance of Hart’s support could help his showing. According to Paul
Abramson, John Aldrich, and David Rohde, the Democratic Party base was changing too
fast:
By 1984, only about one voter in four had entered the electorate before or
during World War II. Among whites born before 1924, those who entered
the electorate before or during the war, class voting was fairly high, some
19 points; it was only 2 points among whites born after 1954. New policy
issues, sometimes unrelated to the political conflicts of the New Deal era,
have tended to erode Democratic support among traditional Democratic
groups. Of all these policies, race-related issues have been the most
important in weakening the New Deal coalition.
Political scientist Samuel Huntington believed that a consequence of the decline
of the New Deal Coalition and growing dominance of the “New Affluents” who tended to
support Hart, was the concept of “categorical representation,” defined as:
the proposition that the interests of particular groups can be properly
represented only by individuals who are themselves members of those
groups, blacks by blacks, women by women, union members by union
members. 160
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It would seem that the changing Democratic Party had changed their nominating
system to emphasize the importance of the Democratic establishment, which was slowly
declining in population and loyalty. The emergence of “yuppies,” individuals who may
have been enthusiastic McGovern supporters in their youth, but were now older, liberal
on matters of foreign policy but conservative in their economic stances, were frustrated
by what seemed to be a Democratic Party beholden to specific groups.
In his book, Minority Party: Why Democrats Face Defeat in 1992 and Beyond,
Peter Brown proposes that much of the divide in the Democratic Party was caused by
whites that felt they had been left behind by their party economically as the Party
embraced minorities who were the subject of new social programs. In his chapter, Jesse
Jackson Scares the Middle Class, Brown notes that:
In January 1984, at the beginning of his first Presidential campaign, a
CBS-New York Times poll showed 16 percent of white Democrats viewed
him [Jackson] favorably, 48 percent unfavorably. 161
It should come as no surprise that even as Mondale lost women, the elderly and
unskilled workers,162 he narrowly won among white union-households (compared to only
one-third of the share in households without a union member).163 The attempt to bring
establishment Democrats back into the Democratic Party had worked, but if any
connection between success in the Democratic primary and general election electability
can be drawn, reforms had no effect beyond helping an insider candidate hold on to
traditional electoral groups.
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Twelve years before, the Democratic Party had been open to the masses and an
insurgent candidate had just barely fended off a challenge by the institution. In 1984,
fortunes had completely reversed as the party had attempted to close the nominating
process. Traditional Democratic groups stood their ground – and they stood alone.
Overcompensation?
Did the Hunt Commission respond appropriately to the needs of the Democratic
Party as evidenced by the 1980 campaign and other considerations? Members of the
commission were sensitive not only to the diminished ability of Democratic elected
officials to insert themselves into the nominating process, but perhaps just as crucial, to
give flexibility back to the convention itself.
The 1976 race had been decided well before the convention, and the bound
delegate (or “robot”) rule in 1980 had prohibited delegates from considering new
developments in the race like Kennedy’s late surge or a major scandal surrounding the
Libyan government and President Carter’s brother.164 In this regard, the party responded
to alleviate the problems that led to a divisive primary in 1980.
The most controversial change by the Hunt Commission, of course, has been the
inclusion of the so-called “super delegates,” in the nominating process. As previously
mentioned, elected officials were opting out of the convention process. Further, Jimmy
Carter was an ultimate outsider whose presidency was defined by a disconnect with
Congress (as Tip O’Neill asked, “Did he still think he was dealing with the Georgia
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legislature?), 165 raising questions about the role of elected officials in helping to select a
nominee.
Congressman David Price recalls many members forced to run against
constituents or other activists to play a role at the convention:
There needed to be a way of accommodating the party for their [elected
officials’] sake, but not just for their sake, but for the party’s sake…this
wasn’t just the matter of some kind of perks or privilege for members of
Congress…the party needed them, and their participation, and their buyin, and the leadership that would give to convention.
The failed “open convention” movement of 1980 showed that party leaders had
lost complete control over the nominating process – whether or not a candidate other than
Jimmy Carter could have won that election will never be known. While the response to
the needs of the previous convention may have seemed proportional and served to
alleviate conflict, in reality, the close 1984 contest had unintended consequences that
made the reforms too strong.
The sheer proportion of super delegates that committed early for Mondale greatly
inhibited Hart’s ability to turn his early momentum into a serious delegate race.
Additionally, the Hunt Commission’s allowing of loophole primaries hurt Hart in many
areas where he ran stronger than Mondale but lost the delegate race.166 While the
elimination of the unit rule appeared to be a shift toward a more democratic process,
following the lead of the Winograd Commission, Hunt Commissioners handed more
power to the party establishment.
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The Democratic Party overcompensated in its efforts to alleviate the difficulties of
previous contests. While the establishment successfully brought elected officials and
decision-making power back to the convention, the party increased thresholds and
roadblocks (like the loophole primary), making it more difficult for an outsider to build
and maintain momentum.
The Post-Reform Era
Following Walter Mondale and Geraldine Ferraro’s 49-state loss to President
Ronald Reagan in 1984, the Democratic Party took few steps to reform its nominating
process. Reforms over the coming years simply would not be substantial. Responding to
comments by many unsuccessful 1984 candidates, including Jesse Jackson, Democratic
National Committee Chairman Paul Kirk created the fairness commission. But the
commission hardly ranks among its predecessors. According to Kamarack:
…members of the Fairness Commission were in no mood to reverse what
the Hunt Commission had done. On October 18, 1985, they decided to
lower the threshold for getting a delegate from 20 percent to 15 percent.
But they allowed states to continue to use the direct election of delegates
system or the bonus system, and they increased the number of superdelegates to the 1988 convention by adding Democratic governors and all
members of the Democratic National Committee… 167
The 1988 contest would see Vice President George Bush, the standard bearer of
the Republican Nomination, compete in a multi-candidate primary, facing individuals
including Secretary of State Al Haig, famous Televangelist Rev. Pat Robertson, perennial
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candidate Senator Bob Dole, and the famous football player-turned-Congressman Jack
Kemp.
Gary Hart was largely expected to be the frontrunner for the 1988 Democratic
nomination for president, but questions about his relationship with model and Miami Vice
actress Donna Rice forced the former Colorado Senator from the race. This void allowed
the entrance of Massachusetts Governor Michael Dukakis, Arizona Governor Bruce
Babbitt, Delaware Senator Joe Biden, Tennessee Senator Al Gore, Jr., Illinois Senator
Paul Simon, the Rev. Jesse Jackson, and others.
Following the party’s second 49-state loss in twelve years, some including thenGovernor Chuck Robb of Virginia, the son-in-law of the late Lyndon Johnson, pushed to
create a Southern Super Tuesday, “to move away from the individual approach - the socalled retail approach,” said Robb, “and see if a candidate could talk about issues and
priorities in presidential terms that require an emphasis on organization, on money, (and)
on the ability to motivate on a broad scale.”168 While Southern Senator Gore carried
several states in his home region, the efforts did nothing to stop the momentum of New
Hampshire Primary winner Dukakis. 169
According to Jack Germond and Jules Whitcover, Dukakis’ victory did nothing to
demonstrate his electability:
Dukakis’ success in Dixie was almost entirely misleading. He built his
triumph largely on minority-group voters in Texas and liberals in South
Florida. He clearly made no breakthrough in the most conservative
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regions of the Cotton South, capturing less than 10 percent of the vote in
Alabama and Mississippi, less than 20 percent in Arkansas, Kentucky,
Georgia, Louisiana and Oklahoma.170
Dukakis, of course, clinched the nomination in advance of the convention
(though, not in the world of Robert Altman and Gary Trudeau’s fictional candidate
Congressman Jack Tanner). While the Fairness Commission had not produced serious
reform, Jesse Jackson’s second candidacy did. Frustrated by rules such as the awarding
of bonus delegates and super delegates, and the direct election of delegates in states
where the campaign did not field delegate candidates Jackson threatened to disrupt the
1988 convention unless Dukakis compromised. According to Kamarck:
Dukakis chose to compromise on the rules, agreeing to get rid of super
delegates (a deal he could not keep since he didn’t win the election and
control the party subsequently) and systems, such as the direct election of
delegates and the bonus delegate system, that rewarded winners in the
presidential nominating process.” 171
While super delegates would not become a thing of the past at the 1988
convention, the Convention passed a resolution declaring that all future delegates would
only be allocated only by proportionality.
The Democrats’ next contest, in 1992, would see the entrance of candidates who,
on paper, created the image of serving to be more electable than a liberal Massachusetts
Governor. Nebraska Senator Bob Kerrey was a Vietnam War Hero, Massachusetts
Senator Paul Tsongas held centrist economic views, Iowa Senator Tom Harkin came
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from the Heartland, Arkansas Governor Bill Clinton was from the South and a rising star,
and the former and future California Governor, and “Moonbeam” Jerry Brown had twice
run for president. Harkin’s presence in the race made his Iowa win virtually meaningless,
allowing Clinton to carry momentum from a second-place finish in Tsongas’ back yard of
New Hampshire.
While Tsongas continued to have wins, Clinton’s outstanding showing in the
March 3 Georgia Primary and on Super Tuesday helped to push others from the race, and
following a surprise campaign suspension by Tsongas, take on Jerry Brown for the
nomination. Many super delegates, however, raised doubts, following a surprise win by
Brown in the Connecticut Primary (where Clinton aides had expected Tsongas to do very
well172) and non-candidate Tsongas’ garnering of 26% of the vote in the important New
York Primary, that the party elite might need to interfere. 173 Clinton prevailed, and with
another Southerner, Senator Albert Gore Jr. of Tennessee, reclaimed the White House for
the Democrats for the first time in sixteen years. Clinton did not face significant
opposition in his 1996 bid for re-nomination.
Four years later, Vice President Gore was the clear frontrunner for the Democratic
Nomination. With the Democrats faced with the first opportunity to elect back-to-back
Democratic presidents for the first time since 1856, supporters of the Vice President
quickly worked to establish contests in a way that would allow Gore to survive a
challenge if necessary. Unlike the last sitting Vice President to seek the nomination,
George Bush, in 1988, Gore would not face a crowded field. Holding the belief that a
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potential win by former New Jersey Senator Bill Bradley in New Hampshire could only
hold water with subsequent victories, the Gore campaign fought to keep a traditional
calendar in place:
To create enough momentum to defeat a sitting vice president for the
nomination, Bradley needed not only a win in New Hampshire but also
wins in other contests soon after New Hampshire, where his momentum
could translate into votes in money. The Gore campaign, nervous about
the situation in New Hampshire, lobbied the Rules and By-Laws
Committee against a change in the calendar.”174
The Gore campaign, as a precaution, had not opposed efforts to move the
California Primary to Super Tuesday, which followed a five-week stretch after the New
Hampshire Primary. 175 Gore won the New Hampshire Primary by four percent, and
would carry the nomination. Despite Gore’s Southern appeal, his ticket with Senator Joe
Lieberman of Connecticut (the first Jewish candidate on a major party ticket), succeeded
in winning the popular vote, but came up short in the Electoral College. With Gore as the
standard bearer of the Democratic Party, many questioned whether or not he would be the
first unsuccessful Democratic nominee since Humphrey in 1972 to seek the nomination
of his party.
Gore opted not to run, and a free-for-all contest ensured, featuring Lieberman,
Massachusetts Senator John Kerry (who had served as Dukakis’ Lt. Governor), House
Minority Leader Dick Gephardt, North Carolina Senator John Edwards, General Wesley
Clark, leftist Congressman Dennis Kucinich, and Vermont Governor Howard Dean. In
174
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an effort to spare a lengthy contest in the first truly competitive race for the Democratic
Nomination in 12 years, Democratic Party rules allowed contests to take place almost
immediately after Iowa and New Hampshire.
Early polls showed the antiwar Dean, capitalizing on Internet organizing and
fundraising opportunities, poised to make a McGovern-style outsider play for the
nomination. The endorsement of Gore further led to press speculation that Dean would
surge to the head of the pack, but back-to-back Kerry wins in Iowa and New Hampshire
helped thrust the Massachusetts Senator to the nomination. Kerry carried every state but
Dean’s Vermont, Oklahoma (which went to Clark), and Edwards’ home state and
birthplace of North and South Carolina, respectively. Kerry had the nomination by early
March. Though the Mondale-Hart fight of 1984 was longer, the 2004 Kerry-Dean
contest showed that a shorter contest gave more opportunity to an establishment
candidate to win the nomination. Additionally, the DNC’s decision to start the contest in
January, to match the Republican National Committee’s calendar and avoid voter
confusion, helped establish a nominee earlier in the year. 176 With Edwards on his ticket,
John Kerry lost the nomination in both the Electoral College and in the popular vote
count.
Concerned with the influence of early states, the state of Michigan had threatened
to move ahead of the New Hampshire Primary, which by a 1996 Granite State law must
be at least one week before or after any similar contest.177 To dissuade Michigan, the
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DNC agreed to form a commission, Chaired by Congressman David Price of North
Carolina and former Secretary of Labor Alexis Herman. The Commission ultimately
established a 2008 calendar that would allow two states to join Iowa and New Hampshire
in the pre-window period. Rejecting an attempt by Michigan, again, the DNC chose a
Western caucus state, Nevada, and Southern Primary state, South Carolina, to add
regional balance for the contest.
The years following the Hunt Commission saw little progress in the reform
movement. With the exception of the movement to total proportionality, the rules for
picking the Democratic nominee for President stayed largely the same. But the 2008
contest, which saw the first major African-American candidate and the first major female
candidate poised to win their party’s nomination reinvigorated the debate on super
delegates, delegate selection, and timing, raising serious questions about the
democraticness of the Democratic contest.
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4| Democratization and a Changing Party

“Before the McGovern reforms neither Hillary Clinton nor Barack Obama would
have had a chance at the nomination. They would have been laughed off the floor.
What we did was really sell the idea that women and minorities, blacks and
Hispanics, are treated the same as the rest of us.”
-

George McGovern

As the fortieth anniversary of Hubert Humphrey’s tumultuous nomination
approached, it appeared that the Democratic Party stood poised to nominate, by all
accounts, an insider, establishment candidate. Since her husband, President Bill Clinton,
had left office, Hillary Rodham Clinton had moved to New York and managed to get
herself elected to the United States Senate. Known for being intently involved in her
husband’s political affairs, and for standing strong through his personal indiscretions,
Clinton looked like the strongest candidate to lead her party to the White House in 2008.
But Clinton’s candidacy would mirror Humphrey’s 1972 quest much more than his 1968
nomination.
In the spirit of McGovern’s 1972 bid and Gary Hart’s 1984 nomination fight,
freshman Illinois Senator Barack Obama embarked on a long-shot bid against Clinton’s
inevitability. Crowding the field were John Edwards, veteran U.S. Senators Chris Dodd
of Connecticut and Joe Biden of Delaware, ultra liberal Ohio Congressman Dennis
Kucinich, New Mexico Governor Bill Richardson, and, briefly featured, an awkward
candidacy by former Alaska Senator Mike Gravel.
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The calendar dictated strategy. From the beginning, the architects of long-shot
Obama’s campaign committed to focus intensely on the early states.178 Influence of early
states did not just mean more lead-time to campaign, but also more time for candidate
scrutiny and media attention; the first debate took place nine months before the first
contest.
Michigan was again threatening to move their contest outside of the DNC
prescribed window, as was Florida. With stern warnings that their delegates would not
be seated at the National Convention in Denver, campaigns agreed not to campaign in the
two “rogue” states (with Clinton later turning back on her promise). While the Obama
campaign breathed a sigh of relief that a big Clinton stronghold would not come days
after the nation’s first two contests, they recognized that an inability to defeat Clinton in
both Iowa and New Hampshire would paint a difficult path, with Clinton standing strong
on the loaded February 5 Super Tuesday contests.179
Despite holding many of the foremost experts in Democratic Party rules and
history, the Clinton campaigned failed to recognize many of the lessons of past
candidacies in the order of contests, such as Jimmy Carter’s creation of a quasi-Super
Tuesday in 1976. From Elaine Kamarck’s Primary Politics:
The Obama campaign acted to maximize its delegate count on that day
[Super Tuesday]. In January 2007, Illinois House Speaker Michael
Madigan and the Illinois Democrats moved their primary to February 5,
2008, so that Illinois could help build Obama’s delegate count should he
get into the race. In Alabama, a young black U.S. representative and
178
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Obama ally, Artur Davis, was instrumental in moving Alabama’s primary
to February 5. In Kansas, supporters of Governor Kathleen Sebelius
helped move Kansas’s caucuses to February 5 without any prompting
from the Obama campaign. 180
Kamarck holds that only two Super Tuesday states, Arkansas and New Jersey,
moved over the course of the lead-up to February 5, 2008, that would benefit Hillary
Clinton. “There is no evidence,” Kamarck wrote, “that anyone tried to move those states
on her behalf.”181
By the time Barack Obama had won the post-Super Tuesday February Maine
caucuses, where some believed Clinton would hold an advantage, Obama had won 11
caucuses, compared to only 2 for Clinton.182 By capitalizing on organizational strength
in caucus states, the Obama campaign was able to run up the score early.
While the “bonus delegates” of 1984 were not present, the Obama campaign
recognized that individual district delegate totals could have an important impact on their
delegate count. In the early Nevada contests, for example, Clinton beat Obama 51-45 in
the popular vote, but Obama beat her in the delegate count 13-12.183 Obama either tied or
beat Clinton in every individual Congressional district.184
Obama’s strength in young organizers allowed him to capitalize on some contests
virtually unchallenged. According to Kamarck, after Clinton’s third-place finish in Iowa,
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“…the campaign, short on money, decided to devote less time and resources to the
remaining caucus states.”185
In Kansas’ Super Tuesday caucuses, Obama won approximately 74% of the
statewide popular vote, to just over 25% for Hillary Clinton.

In Kansas’ third

congressional district (which Obama would carry in the general election), which offered
seven delegates, Obama won five. 186 Even with victories in big states like California,
Obama won twelve Super Tuesday contests compared to Clinton’s five.
With a tight delegate count, many began questioning whether or not super
delegates would decide the outcome of the race. In the end, Obama topped Clinton 1,763
to 1,640 in pledged (elected) delegates. Obama lead 438-256 lead among superdelegates
put the Illinois Senator well over the 2,118 necessary to win the nomination. In the fall,
Obama trounced Senator John McCain of Arizona 365-173 in the Electoral College,
carrying states like Indiana, which Democrats had not managed to pick up since Lyndon
Johnson’s 1964 landslide.
According to Jay Cost, Obama finished the Democratic contest with a 3.1% lead
in pledged delegates, compared to only a 0.4% lead in the popular vote. 187 This
substantial lead, which Cost attributes to the efficiency of the Obama operation, was
because of caucus successes:
Across all caucuses, Obama won about 679,000 supporters and 280
delegates. Clinton won about 379,000 caucus supporters and 145
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delegates. Thus, for a net of 300,000 votes, Obama netted 135 delegates.
To put this in perspective, consider that Clinton defeated Obama by more
than 500,000 votes in [primary state] California, but only netted 38
delegates.188
Cost further suggests that had Clinton’s delegate aggregation had such a high
efficiency rate, that the delegate count at the nomination would have been extraordinarily
close at just fourteen pledged delegates.189
While some feared that the Illinois Senator’s inability to top Clinton in
battleground states crucial to a fall victory (like Pennsylvania and Ohio), the strategy to
focus on small states and red states paid off for Obama.
Part of Obama’s success was his ability to turn out the youth that Democratic
candidates since Ed Muskie and George McGovern had dreamed of turning out to the
polls. In North Carolina, for example, the Obama campaign boasted 200,000 new
registrants – and won the state by a slim 14,000 votes.190
Obama’s strengths certainly came among traditional Democratic coalitions – but
even with the first formidable female candidate in the race for the Democratic
nomination, the young Senator managed to beat Clinton among women in crucial
contests like Iowa and the general election bellwether state of Missouri. In the fall,
Obama would win 49% of all men and 56% of all women, losing among whites.
While Democrats have struggled to make inroads with white men, they have
successfully won the White House three times without a majority approving of their
188
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candidate.191 In many ways, following a Democratic nominating process that yielded
more young and diverse delegates than ever before,192 the 2008 contest produced not only
a coalition, but a candidate emblematical of the initial McGovern inclusionary reforms.
“Before the McGovern reforms neither Hillary Clinton nor Barack Obama would
have had a chance at the nomination,” said George McGovern, “They would have been
laughed off the floor. What we did was really sell the idea that women and minorities,
blacks and Hispanics, are treated the same as the rest of us.” 193
While Obama’s strength among youth, women, and minorities helped put him
over the finish line, in many ways, changing demography played a role more than the
motivation of those initially targeted by Democratic efforts by the early part of the reform
movement.194
Obama’s ability to draw new voters and demographic groups that might not
typically vote into the Farms and American Legion Halls of Iowa and the ballot booths of
South Carolina was largely responsible for his victory. According to David Greenberg,
Obama’s appeal may have been due to an alarming fact:
While Obama performed best among leftists and centrist or nonideological
(Perot-style) independents, she [Clinton] prevailed among mainstream
liberal and centrist party regulars. While most of Obama’s’ primary
victories occurred in “open” contests, she fared better in those limited to
191
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Democrats…she may have won a majority of actual Democrats’ votes – a
stunning and little noted fact.195
Greenberg suggests an astonishing proposition: that the Democratic nominee in
2008, and only the third Democratic President since the reform era began, did not hold
the edge in support among those who considered themselves to be active, committed
members of the Democratic Party. A study of the Iowa Caucus entrance polls, a critical
victory for the Obama campaign, shows that the eventual nominee only carried 41% of
independent caucus goers (20% of the electorate), just barely edging Clinton out by 1%
among Democrats in a three-way race with second-place finisher Edwards.
With so much attention focused on the demographic groups that Obama was able
to turn out in significant numbers, one must question whether or not his ultimate success
came from turning out underrepresented groups that the reform movement had first tried
to turn out in 1972. Black voters turned out strongly for the first African-American
candidate for President, and young people played a key role.

Interestingly, in the May

North Carolina Primary, Obama carried 65% of first-time voters, but lost white
Democrats to Clinton by a full 25%.196
In Jeff Taylor’s Where Did the Party Go, the Dordt College Political Scientist
highlights the fact that the first two Democratic presidents to serve after the reform
movement began, Jimmy Carter and Bill Clinton, were connected to the Humphrey
“fraternity” of the Democratic Party. Carter was a leader in the “Anybody But
McGovern” efforts at the 1972 convention, and Clinton “began public life as a protégé of
195
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Senator William J. Fulbright (D-AR), a Bourbon politician who seconded Humphrey’s
nomination for vice president at the 1956 convention.”197 Yet, Taylor does not believe
that, based on substance, Obama’s successful candidacy was the fulfillment of the
“McGovern coalition”:
I agree that Obama's '08 campaign had some of the flavor of a grassroots
crusade a la Bryan '96 or McGovern '72, but there's a difference between
style and substance. I think there are some parallels between the Obama
and McGovern efforts…Despite youthful, idealistic backing for Obama in
'08, I would not place him in the New Politics, anti-CDM camp. He was
no Mike Gravel or Dennis Kucinich. Superdelegates and party
pro's eventually gravitated to Obama over Clinton because he was seen as
a safe choice. That's why rival Biden described Obama as a "mainstream
African-American who is articulate and bright and clean" and why
Goldman, Sachs became Obama's #1 contributor. From his attendance at
elite schools and joining of the Daley machine to his becoming a reliable
friend of Wall Street and the Military-Industrial Complex, Obama has
always understood how the game is played and has been willing to play by
the rules…Instead of being a populist/anti-establishment/New
Politics example, Obama was a representative of the Kennedy fraternity
within Democratic Party centrism (the "progressive" mainstream) in
2008.198
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Perhaps Obama’s nomination was indeed the fulfillment of the desires of the
McGovern-Fraser commission members who fought for inclusionary reforms. However,
Obama was not substantively the same candidate on the major issues as McGovern or
those activists who had fought to open the process.
While Congressman David Price believes that the Obama campaign “bared some
resemblance to the McGovern phenomenon, Price said that the 2008 campaign was vastly
different than the 1972 contest. “Obama had much, much more establishment support. I
think that McGovern and the Democratic electorate was much more polarized [in 1972],”
said Price. “I would say the Obama base was broader and more diverse…and pulling
things together after convention was not as difficult, simply because the differences were
not as great to begin with.”199
Additionally, Obama was able to carry Democratic Party establishment support to
help secure the party nomination. Super delegates largely followed the lead of pledged
delegates, with Obama overtaking Clinton among this bloc of party establishment leaders
after a strong showing by Obama in the Indiana and North Carolina Primaries. On May
12, four key endorsements from activists and elected officials in Idaho, Hawaii, and
Maine, gave Obama a lead among super delegates for the first time in the race for the
nomination.200
Many Democrats feared that an overly divisive contest would have the same
effect as close, bitter contests in 1968, 1972, 1980 and 1984. But Todd Makse and Anand
Sokhey argue in their study of Franklin County, Ohio, a state where Obama struggled to
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captivate working-class voters during the primary but carried in the fall, that the wounds
left from the primary very well could have cost Obama the general election had the fall
2008 financial meltdown not occurred. Approximately 18% of Clinton supporters voted
for McCain in Ohio, consistent with their local findings. A sample run by Maske and
Sokhey looking at Obama’s difficulty with white voters, compared the votes garnered of
African-American mayor of Columbus, Michael Coleman in 2007 to Obama’s 2008
results. The results did show divisiveness:
The results…demonstrate that voting patterns in the 2007 election are
indeed a significant predictor of Obama overperformance. However, once
again, the divisive primary effect holds up quite well, with the main effect
shrinking by a fairly modest 15% in magnitude. 201
Looking at the 2008 race in the context of two separate elections, the primary and
the general election contest, it is worth remembering that McGovern himself failed to
carry groups important to his nomination in the general election,202 losing both women
and the youth vote.203 Obama’s victory greatly benefited, as well, from union support;
although labor’s strength has greatly diminished over the years, about 2% of his support
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came from labor households. As FiveThirtyEight’s Nate Silver points out, successful
Democratic nominees in recent elections have won by only about 4%.204
However, Clinton’s high level of support among those who considered
themselves committed Democrats raises the question of which candidate actually had a
cohesive base that could carry them in the general election. In his discrediting of the
“Divisive Primary Theory,” The Divided Democrats, William Mayer cites a 1974 study
of two Congressional contests which found that 80% of those activists who supported an
unsuccessful candidate for the nomination but not the nominee “had less than five years
political experience, only 24 percent were strong party identifiers, and 47 percent said
they were working in their first political campaign.”205 Mayer cites the explosion, over
the years, of candidate-centered campaigns as a key reason.
Barack Obama was able to reclaim the White House from Republican hands for
the first time in sixteen years largely because of his campaign’s understanding of the
proportionality rules and different state contests. Unlike the same McGovern-style
coalition in 1972, Obama was able to create wide general-election appeal among the firsttime and stagnant voters in the fall that helped propel him to the nomination.
Democrats had always maintained an edge among Blacks and Hispanics, and
women for the preceding four general election cycles, but changing demographics
coupled with turnout contributed to success. While the proportion of white voters had
been declining steadily over the years, in 2008, white voters made up just 76.3% of the
electorate, compared to 84.6% when the last Democratic President, Bill Clinton, was
elected in 1992. African-Americans increased in their proportion of the electorate by
204
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nearly 5% since 2004. The appeal of the first minority to represent a major party in its
quest for the White House surely must have had an impact on turnout, but changing
demographics meant that Blacks accounted for 16 million votes in 2008,206 95% of the
black vote.
Reform in Retrospect

With the largest of the reforms in the past, the key role that super delegates played
in the 2008 contest, coupled with comparisons between the 2008 and 1968 and 1972
contests raises an important question: Democratic Party Reform accomplish what the
framers set out to achieve?
“That really does beg the question of what it set out to do,” said Congressman
David Price, who served as Staff Director of the Hunt Commission and Co-Chair of the
Herman-Price Commission. “To the extent that the idea was to make for a more
transparent, participatory, standardized process…to that extent, yes. But this is an area
where…if the law of unintended consequences didn’t originate here, it certainly applies
here.”207
While many may have viewed the party reform effort as an important movement,
ultimately rooted in opening the doors to the Democratic Party to those who had been
shut out of the 1968 convention, the full ramifications could never have been predicted.
The clarity of the original intentions of the framers has been largely lost by the many
resulting changes triggered by a few delegates to the 1968 Connecticut State convention.
206
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Two works on the reform movement, Nelson Polsby’s Consequences of Party
Reform and Austin Ranney’s Curing the Mischiefs of Faction paint a definitive picture of
a pendulum swing toward a strong, open, national party – before gravity pushed the
pendulum in the other direction in the 1980s. Referring to a lengthy, proportional contest
with very few “super delegates,” “In many ways,” said Geoff Cowan, “the [2012]
Republican Party nominating process is more small-‘d’ democratic than the Democratic
Party.”208
Few argue against the assertion that the Democratic Party became more “open” to
outsiders by the early reform movement and, despite a shift towards peer review in the
1980s, the movement ultimately led to the creation of a system that is virtually decided
by open primaries and caucuses. While some like V.O. Key and Ranney hold that the
primary greatly opened up the party structure and harmed cohesiveness, others like Leon
Epstein believe “that the direct primary is more a symptom than a cause – that it has not
made the parties what they are but rather is itself a result of the fact that “Americans
haven’t wanted to leave the selection of their party candidates entirely in the hands of
organized partisans.”209
But without “organized partisans” in control, who was left to make the decisions
for an increasingly centralized national Democratic party? As Ranney wrote, “…the
delegates [to the 1972 convention] not only looked different from the way most ordinary
Democratic voters look, but they also had a different ideological coloring.” 210 Ranney
makes it clear that the framers did not want “old hands” to have any advantages over
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“new hands”; resulting in a Democratic Party nominating convention in 1972 that
represented a very different constituency than mainstream Democratic voters. 211
As the 2008 race between Barack Obama and Hillary Clinton tightened, media
and public criticism of “undemocratic” super delegates grew louder. While the likelihood
that elected officials would overturn democratic votes was slim, to Americans unaware of
reform history, the process seemed reminiscent of the smoke-filled rooms of yesteryear.
But was the inclusion of super delegates inconsistent with the spirit of reform?
Not according to Geoff Cowan, who said that the original McCarthy organizers
who set reform in motion never actually intended to push party regulars out of the
process. “As explained in the rule that we proposed and that the convention adopted,”
Cowan recalled, “we simply believed that all delegates should be selected in a process
open to full public participation in the calendar year of the election.” 212 “What is
democratic,” said Cowan, “has changed over the years.”213
If the intent of the reformers was, as ringleader Cowan describes, to simply open
up the process for democratic contests, the intent of the original reformers has been
fulfilled. While super delegates were reduced after the 2008 contest by the Democrats’
Change Commission, co-chair James Roosevelt justified the commission’s work to keep
the system relatively intact:
People ask: isn’t it enough for folks to have floor privileges and a hotel
room and not have an actual vote? The answer is: what you’re doing is
creating two classes of delegates, people with the vote and people without
the vote. Clearly, the people at the grassroots level should be the
211
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predominant voice. But if you don’t give elected officials a real voice,
they are basically second-class citizens. 214

To some like Gary Hart, to whom super delegates played a key role in keeping
from the White House, super delegates are an acceptable part of the party nominating
process, when kept in check. “I come back to the difference in 1984 – all super delegates
for Mondale, and 2008, when they were divided principally in the long run between
Obama and Clinton. That’s the way it should be. If super delegates will be open minded
and not vote in lock step and follow the election results in their own states and district,
there’s nothing wrong with that.”215
All Democratic contests were proportional in 2008, but as Barack Obama showed,
the system is as much about strategy as it is about simply earning the respect and
admiration of voters. But certainly, the framers could have never anticipated the mediadriven, lengthy, contest-by-contest campaign that now characterizes presidential
campaigns.
Recent debates have concerned the order and speed of primary contests, and
Congressman David Price points out that the 2008 contest, in which Hillary Clinton
failed to drop out until the final primary contests had passed, showed Americans what a
lengthy, rather than a frontloaded, contest looks like. But the era of major reforms is
largely over.
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The seemingly never ending seesaw of reform represented a battle between
committed democratic reformers and a group of Democratic Party stalwarts determined
to keep the influence of those who were elected under the Democratic Party banner, not
just for entitlement, but for purposes of strategy and governance. The emergence of a
nationalized party created a serious view that elected officials were elected to represent
the views of the party, but to keep it strong. According to Jim Hunt, there was a
disconnect between the idealists and those who understood how to keep the party going:
It's very easy for the academicians – and thank G-d for ‘em – and the
people who study things and sit back and try to figure things out from afar,
and who are not “down in the pit,” as Teddy Roosevelt said. It’s easy for
them to think they know exactly how things work. If they're in there
working day and night having to put together a delegation that can get the
states electoral votes, they often see things very differently from the
people who are … the people have the theories…the people who fight to
be pure in a sense, they want to be pure whether they win or not …they
just want to be pure.216
Since the Democratic Party was “opened,” every Democratic nominee to reach
the White House – Jimmy Carter, Bill Clinton, and Barack Obama, has been, to a degree,
a political “outsider.” Whether or not a distance from the party establishment helps the
Commander-in-Chief govern is debatable, but the situation has unquestionably changed
the dynamic between Democratic insiders in Congress and the occupant at 1600
Pennsylvania Avenue.
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The reform movement, ever evolving, transformed how candidates seek the
Presidency and govern while in office. Whether or not the Democratic Party nominating
system has been more democratic at a given point in the nominating process is entirely
subjective – but the reform movement has, unquestionably, met the expectations of those
who set out to ensure that no candidate would ever see the same fate as Eugene McCarthy
in 1968. The Democratic Party, for the most part, responded proportionately to its
challenges, and built a hybrid nominating process that allows for open participation and
establishment influence.
The Future?
The most recent Democratic presidential nominating contest saw a divisive
contest where deep divisions were not enough to cost the party nominee the general
election. While Hillary Clinton was viewed by the media and many Americans as an
"insider candidate," her great appeal among many women and white working class voters
made the race hardly a battle between solely the party establishment and the general
Democratic electorate. The 2008 race, however, does not close the door on the future
possibility of a fight between a candidate substantially favored by the Democratic Party
establishment and a candidate favored by the general electorate -- and changes in
technology and campaign finance laws are poised to create a more divisive contest than
ever before.
Candidates in the 2008 race had to compete with a citizenry engaged online with
access to social media organizing tools. By the time the 2016 race for the Democratic
nomination is in full-swing, candidates will instantly be held accountable by voters for
their background, positions, gaffes, and flaws, via internet tools like Facebook, Twitter,
93

and YouTube. The years to come are likely to see candidates who are forced to move
more quickly to meet the policy desires of activists, amplified and energized by new
technologies. In short, the Democratic Party contest of 2016 is poised to become more
open and more democratic than ever before.
Candidates are slowly losing control of their messages to outside forces,
especially in light of the Supreme Court of the United States' decision in Citizens United
v. FEC. A divide between a mobilized, online general electorate and corporate interests
spending significant sums of money for airtime will make it continually harder for
candidates to define themselves and messages in the media.
Arguably, if Americans can shift the conversation online to issues that the general
electorate is concerned about, candidates who are forced to make early, multiple
promises, candidates will likely be forced to take early positions and be more beholden to
citizen interest groups than ever before.
The Democratic Party democratized itself because of the concerns of outside
forces. The framers of reform sought to open the doors to the Democratic Party
nominating contest, and they emboldened and empowered voters in the process.
Candidates may become increasingly concerned with the interests of voters and less with
the priorities of the Democratic establishment. This evolution may be good for
democracy, but its effect on governing and the Democratic Party may tell a different
story.
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